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Home > Journals > 2008 > Vol. 34 No. 1 > Building an Integrated Force: Overcoming Challenges to Operate as ONE SAF
Building an Integrated Force: Overcoming Challenges to Operate as ONE SAF
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by LTC Tan Ah Han Tommy, MAJ Teoh Chun Ping & CPT Boh Lee Wee

"... that end is to build ONE SAF - an SAF that is integrated, networked, cohesive, synergistic, self-synchronous and singular in its mission focus to deter threats to our security, territorial integrity and sovereignty ..."

LG Desmond Kuek, Chief of Defence Force,
Singapore Armed Forces

As the RSAF embarks on its 3rd Generation transformation journey, over the next few years, we will continue to see extensive changes to its force structure, concept of operations, people development and organisation to achieve our vision of becoming a Full Spectrum and Integrated Force. The need for a full spectrum and integrated force is clearly evident in the recent major military operations, such as Ops Iraqi Freedom1, where combining air, land and sea capabilities their mission would have helped to deliver a potent combat power. Our increasing participation in peacekeeping, homeland security and humanitarian relief operations in the regional front also demands tight interoperability across the Services and external agencies. These operations have clearly demonstrated the need to pool resources, expertise and manpower across all Services throughout the planning-to-execution continuum. By bridging and integrating each Service's operational capabilities, the SAF could transit quickly to operations with the most optimised force package.

To this end, while most can understand that "Full Spectrum" is to undertake military operations across the peace-to-war spectrum, there is a need for better clarity and understanding on the RSAF being an Integrated Force. Taking reference from Collins English Dictionary, "integrated" denotes the act to be made into a unified whole. Translating to our context, RSAF as an Integrated Force will mean that we must be able to prepare ourselves such that we can be made into a unified SAF, together with other Services, to achieve the SAF's overall operational objectives.

Bringing this further, what this means is that in our 3rd Generation transformation journey, the RSAF must harness each and every emerging quantum leap capability, develop the new integrated concepts and re-structure our organisation for better alignment towards an Integrated Force. We must also revise our people development and training programmes to inculcate a more integrated and well-rounded set of skills and perspectives. The end objective is to be able to speak a common language with the Army and Navy, and have standard operating doctrines and procedures so that RSAF could plug in easily and play immediately with other assigned forces within a readily understood set of rules. In the earlier POINTER article on "Enhancing Integration in Transformation"2, the writers had articulated the integration journey in the SAF so far. Moving ahead, we see a greater need and more opportunities for tighter integration across the SAF. The result of integration would be an Air Force able to bridge divides across Services and across functional expertise areas.

However, while we seek to be an Integrated Force, there are significant, practical and even deeply rooted challenges. This is because each Service today is already mature, ready and capable in its own domain competencies. Hence, this article will attempt to (1) identify the key challenges to overcome, and (2) outline the focus areas and efforts towards our vision to become an Integrated Force.

Challenges

"... Modern military organisations and operations are incredibly complex...it will be an advantage in having doctrines of the three Services harmonised under a common system so that the commanders and staff officers in all the Services learn from the beginning to speak one language and work in complete harmony..."

Dr Goh Keng Swee,
Defence Minister, 1970

As the SAF is already a well-established force where each Service is already mature, ready, and capable in its own domain competencies, significant practical and deeply-rooted challenges, such as disparity in operating languages and standards, stand in the way of achieving effective cross-Service integration.

Bridge the Operating Language

The rapid expansion of the Services in the SAF over the 80s and 90s had hinged on each Service's close interactions with foreign military partners. While the strong affinity developed had contributed to SAF's overall attainment of world-class status, it has inevitably resulted in deep-rooted foreign influences on each Service's operating processes and lingo. The result is an SAF whose Services share operating processes and lingo with their foreign counterparts more than they do with one another, and these differences form the barrier to tighter interoperability across Services. Hence, it is critical to explore ways to bridge the gap in communicating operationally across domains. With a much faster pace of development in each Service, introducing new acronyms and project names such as CARDINAL, it is even more important to bring aboard other Services in order to close the gap.

Align Operational Standards

The inherent differences in the operating environment for each of the three Services have naturally generated different operating standards. For instance, while the air situation picture requires a stringent refresh rate in terms of minutes and seconds to meet with the dynamism of the air domain, the Army, on the other hand, is tolerant up to a one or two hourly refresh rate for its land battle situation picture. It is therefore not unusual to find Air Force units doing time synchronisation as part of their daily start-of-day briefs. Fundamental issues such as mandatory crew rest period for the flying crew could also be a potential source of misunderstanding when hasty combined mission planning is required between the flying squadron and the Army unit. There had also been tactical-level challenges for cross-domain operations. For instance, in heli-borne operations, there used to be disparity in Standard Operation Procedures when it came to the sequence of donning of the life-vests and the SBOs, which when taken individually, had their unique purpose.

For effective integrated operations, tighter inter-Service alignment in terms of synchronisation and coordination is instrumental towards the delivery of timely and precise effects.
Hence for effective integrated operations, tighter inter-Service alignment in terms of synchronisation and coordination is pivotal to deliver timely and precise effects. From the larger perspective, it would also mean overcoming the disparity in operating standards and expectations. Moving ahead, the SAF will be phasing in new and more complex systems that transcend domains, such as the naval helicopter. We will have to be even more deliberate in bridging the operating standards and needs between cross-Services units, such that we can employ the new systems effectively with no compromise to safety.

Towards an Integrated Force

"... within the Air Force and the SAF, we are serious in bridging the domain and functional divides so that we would operate together more strongly as a team. This is particularly important at a time when technologies respect no domain or functional stove-pipes."

MG Ng Chee Khern, Chief of Air Force,
Republic of Singapore Air Force

The first step towards an Integrated Force is to overcome the challenges as stated above by enhancing the interoperability amongst previously Service-specific capabilities. Greater interoperability at all levels, across different platforms, missions and Command Posts (CPs), would translate to better synergy towards integrated operations, preventing fratricide and achieving credible operational effects across domains. For example, at the platform-to-platform level, seamless interoperability between the fighters and the artillery gun would help to enhance our strike precision capability. Similarly, close mission-to-mission integration would optimise air support for the land battle; and tight CP-to-CP connectivity would allow sharing and understanding of plans and operating pictures. To do all these, we will need to focus on five key areas.

First, we need to leverage on emerging, high pay-off technologies to enhance interoperability between Services. C4I systems, if properly harnessed and assimilated within our force structure, will serve as useful tools to address inter-dependency issues within the SAF, and create capacity for us to handle a wider span of operations for the SAF in greater breadth and depth. For example, a common IKC2 platform will help the Services to interact effectively across different information domains. However, we must also be cognisant that different operational demands within different domains engender different information requirements in the war-fighting processes. For example, as the RSAF plays an increasingly important role in participation missions to support the Army and Navy, timely cross-domain intelligence support is vital to prevent fratricide and enhance mission success. This translates to the requirement for a fused common operating picture, that, while maintaining the integrity of individual Service's operating norms and expertise, must be well-understood and aligned to the other two Services' operational demands. Certainly, the same IKC2 infrastructure cannot be optimised for integrated operations and be just as optimised for each domain. Nonetheless, it would be essential to be able to share a common operating picture across cross-domain partners.

It is important to review our structures and orgnisation to expand our competency in shaping land and maritime battles by employing airpower where and when it matters most.
Second, it is important to review our structures and organisation to expand our competency in shaping the land and maritime battles by employing air power where and when it matters most. Our establishment of the Participation Command (PC) was the first step taken to ensure integrated development of air power application in the Land and Maritime theatres. PC is envisioned to develop the structures and processes that will catalyse integrated training and exercises with the Army and Navy at the tactical to operational level, bringing together cross-functional capabilities from across the RSAF and integrating them into the land and sea campaigns. For example, during Ex. Wallaby, PC will enhance air-land and air-sea interoperability in the SAF by bringing the participation elements together and ensuring that the team assigned for a mission trains regularly as an integrated team. Such a role is enabled by two-way cross-Service reporting channels between PC and related Army and Navy staff branches, in addition to the tri-Service staff composition organic to HQ PC itself to equip PC with the requisite tri-Service expertise.

The UAV Command (UC) follows a similar Joint and cross-Service staffing to effectively exploit UAVs for cross-Service and cross-functional applications, integrating UAV-borne capabilities at the SAF level, across the air, land and sea domains. As UAV operations increasingly straddle across the Services, UC plays a key role to instil a common operational outlook and standards of governance amongst the SAF community of UAV operators. The establishment of such integrated Operational Commands entails intimate cross-Service operational understanding, close coordination, and establishment of linkages and processes between the Services throughout the peacetime training to wartime planning-to-execution continuum. The end result is an intuitive and automatic synchronisation of planning norms, coupled with real-time, effective, and dynamic swinging of air power to support and dominate the land and sea domain battles, with efficient resource-allocation and minimum risks of fratricide, while capitalising on the RSAF's flat command structure and network-centric domain expertise.

The RSAF has already seen progressive developments towards closer working relationships between Services, with the many cross-Service representations in development teams and in the many staff functions. Such close ties are important in promoting sharing of cross-domain perspectives to achieve greater integration. As we undergo organisational changes in the RSAF and across the SAF, we will see the propagation of the microcosms of cross-Service representations downwards. With cross-Service representations at every level, we can expect to think, develop and operate much more closely for integrated capabilities and operations.

Third, we have to focus on refining the Command and Control (C2) structure and streamlining the processes and linkages to enhance interoperability and increase interdependency with other Services. As we develop and integrate more multi-role capabilities, we must develop the necessary C2 structure and processes to optimise the command and control of assets that may be employed across domains. With shared assets and shared awareness, decision-making during high operational intensity will become more dynamic and challenging, increasing the complexity of integrated operations and cross-domain force employment. Therefore, it is important to develop and improve C2 processes for integrated operations and for dynamic C2 over shared capabilities, accompanied by the necessary training for commanders and operators in these new systems and processes.

Tri-Service workshops, seminars and sharing sessions are some of the means to foster closer relationship and streamline work processes between the Services. Through these sessions, we can better appreciate the intricacies and complexities of integrated planning and campaign orchestration, determining the actions needed to harmonise air, land and sea powers to realise the concerted integrated operations. It will also deepen our knowledge of current thinking and ideas with regards to integrated operations, gleaning the important lessons derived from the years of experience through training, exercises and past integrated efforts during contingency operations. In doing so, we will be able to better bridge the operating language and align operational standards.

To function as an effective integrated force, we will need to review our training system and exercises to inculcate a more integrated and well-rounded set of skills and perspectives.
Fourth, we need to review our training system and exercises to inculcate a more integrated and well-rounded set of skills and perspectives to function as an effective integrated force. The shift of operational focus from low-probability-high-intensity to high-probability-low-intensity operations in peacetime will necessitate the raising of integrated force units that are flexible and can offer calibrated options to a wide variety of operations. These include Operations Other Than War and Peace Support Operations type missions, which are unstructured, lean in scale and extended in duration compared to that of conventional war typified by dynamism, massiveness and intensity in scale. Hence, the development of integrated and interoperable training and training systems to raise an effective integrated force will be necessary in the form of integrated training exercises, integrated simulation and instrumentation.

Last but not least, integrated training should be predicated upon a common culture in order to produce sustainable results. The development of a common culture should not have to displace Service roots and identity. Rather, the fostering of a "ONE" culture should complement individual Service culture. It can even leverage on existing Service-unique values to be promulgated to the other Services as part of the educational and training process through Core Values and instillation of commitment to one another, to the organisation, to the mission and the country so that there is a sense of true and sustained purpose.

To this end, while we focus on integrating our capabilities across the air, land and sea domains to shape and influence the campaign outcome, it is important that our cross-functional, cross-domain developments be anchored on strong professionalism and depth competencies. Our Operational Commands must also be tightly integrated within themselves - maintaining a fine balance between cross-Service integrated Concept of Operations, capability, doctrine and training development - while not diluting the raising, training and sustaining of type-level depth competencies. A possible solution to achieve this balance lies in the raising of an integrated HQ consisting of tri-Service and Joint personnel to oversee the former in peacetime, and then assigning various specialised Task Forces under Operational Command to the HQ as we transit into wartime mission execution. The sufficient and efficient attainment of both functions is the key to a smooth transition from peacetime training to wartime mission success. This, in turn, requires our people to clearly understand both the RSAF and SAF mission across the strategic to tactical levels so that the strategic intent of the SAF can be achieved within the context of tactical operations. The newly-established Air Combat Command exemplifies such a balanced structure.

Conclusion

The 3rd Generation RSAF seeks to become a Full Spectrum, Integrated Force exploiting cross-domain capabilities and concepts to achieve the SAF's operational objectives. To achieve this, we will need to explore and experiment new concepts, harness new technologies and force structure, and develop our people to realise our vision of becoming a Full Spectrum, Integrated Force. An Integrated Force approach for the RSAF will also mean that warfighting will increasingly involve a collaborative and task-oriented approach from all the three Services. Service boundaries will be increasingly overlapped, and we will be able to achieve the integrated effect of fighting as ONE SAF.

Endnotes

1 In 2003, coalition forces under the leadership of the United States invaded Iraq and captured Baghdad in three weeks through the execution of what was envisaged to be simultaneous air and ground assaults.
2 LTC Tan Ying Kiat, MAJ Lee Siew Hui, MAJ Aldrin Tan and CPT Tay Shulin, "Enhancing Integration in Transformation", POINTER Vol 33 No 1, 2007.

LTC Tan Ah Han Tommy is currently a Branch Head in Air Operations Department. A Fighter Pilot by training, he was formerly an Officer Commanding in 145 Squadron and a Staff Officer in Air Plans Department. LTC Tan is a recipient of the SAF Overseas Training Award and he holds a Bachelor of Engineering (Honours) in Aerospace Engineering from Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, Australia.
MAJ Teoh Chun Ping is currently an Officer-on-course at the Singapore Command and Staff College. A Pilot by training, he was formerly an Officer Commanding in 126 Squadron and a Section Head in Joint Plans and Transformation Department. MAJ Teoh is a recipient of the SAF Merit Scholarship and he holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree from University of Cambridge, U.K., and a Master of Science in Aeronautics from California Institute of Technology, U.S.A.
CPT Boh Lee Wee is currently a Section Head in Air Intelligence Department. A Weapon Systems Officer (ADA) by training, she was formerly a Platoon Commander in 3 DA Battalion. CPT Boh is a recipient of the SAF Merit Scholarship and she holds a Bachelor of Science in Liberal Arts and Sciences and a Master of Science in Applied Personnel Psychology from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, U.S.A.
Last updated on 11 Jun 2008
 
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