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Home > Journals > 2008 > Vol. 34 No. 1 > Safety and the RSAF Transformation
Safety and the RSAF Transformation
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by MG Ng Chee Khern

The RSAF achieved something significant in the last workyear. We achieved our first accident-free year since Workyear 2000. The S211 crash on 2 Oct 01 had ended our last zero-accident record. For 6 years in a row since, we have had accidents. But last year, we halted the trend, re-establishing our zero-accident record. There were a few close calls indeed, which we must continue to try to eradicate. But let's give credit where it is due, for many people have put in a lot of hard work to ensure that we had a safe year. No Air Force flies 53,000 hours without accident due to luck. My thanks therefore to the men and women of the RSAF, as well as our partners from Singapore Technologies and Defence Science and Technology Agency. Your efforts have made this zero-accident year possible.

What I like in particular is that nobody has talked much about this achievement. Nobody has made it a big deal, nobody has blown their own trumpet. Perhaps it has not even struck some of our people that we have achieved our first accident-free year since Workyear 2000. This is good because it shows that we are not complacent. I only want to point out this achievement here to thank our people, not to sound complacent.

Some people may think that our zero-accident record was achieved in spite of our transformation. What I would do in this article is to point out that this is probably not true. At the beginning of our transformation two years ago, I was indeed concerned that as we switched focus to concentrate more on task competence, our fundamental type competence and standards might drop. But as I thought deeper about the relationship between our transformation and safety, I would like to share that our transformation efforts, and in particular the CARDINAL which seeks to develop the 3rd Generation Airman, complement our safety efforts. I think in this respect, last year's zero accident record should give us confidence that indeed, not only is transformation and safety a non-zero-sum game, transformation as we have carried it out can reinforce safety.

In this article, I will share my philosophy towards safety which I have crystallised in the last few months as I thought deeper about how to manage the RSAF transformation in the coming year.

Two Approaches to Safety - Analogy of Eastern and Western Medicine

In medicine, there are two distinct approaches. Western medicine is very rational, scientific and clinical. Remedial actions and medications have to be rigorously tested and measured. This approach has been instrumental in bringing down mortality rates. However, Western medicine is largely reactive and it takes the physical functioning of body parts as the starting point. It has also not brought about long-term well-being. Something seems to be missing.

Eastern medicine, on the other hand, seems less structured. Many of us think of Chinese medicine as grandmother remedies or stories. Some of the practices even verge on the mythical and the superstitious. (I must apologise here as I don't know enough about the other forms of Eastern medicine, such as Indian medicine, to talk knowledgeably about them although I suspect that most of them may be more similar in philosophical approach to Chinese than to Western medicine.) But the strength of Chinese medicine is that it takes a holistic view of how the body as a whole functions. The physical, emotional and psychological well-being of a person rather than the functioning of body parts are taken as the starting point.

We can have two approaches to safety that parallel these two approaches to medicine. The first is akin to the Western approach, to look at safety narrowly, tackle each incident as it arises and take steps to prevent each type of incident. This is an approach that the Air Force has developed for many years and we have a very strong system of doing it now. But looking at safety incident-by-incident seems to leave something out. For instance, we have conducted system reviews over the years, including safety stand-downs after a particularly bad spate of incidents or an accident. Such reviews often found that despite good safety processes, the processes were somehow not followed. We then concluded that it was probably an isolated incident, related to an individual being the weak link. But this conclusion leaves some of us dissatisfied. We feel there is something more fundamentally wrong that needs to be tackled; some deeply buried reasons and trends not visible by looking at the immediate causes.

Akin to the Eastern philosophy towards medicine, providing treatment by seeing the RSAF as a holistic system will not only eradicate the immediate symptoms, but also improve the longer-term health of the organisation.
This brings me to the second approach to safety, analogous to the Eastern philosophy towards medicine. This approach sees the RSAF as a holistic system. It suggests treatments that not only eradicate the immediate symptoms, but improve the health of the organisation for the longer term. It deals with issues at the core, the roots of the problem, the wider and deeper forces from where the safety compromises may have originated. Later in this article, you will see how our transformation efforts indeed touch on the deeper health of the RSAF.

Let me illustrate with two examples. Some time ago, a retired Air Force officer related to me a story that happened in the midst of the 1980s Skyhawk crisis. After one of the accidents, there was some preliminary talk about making an example of the Squadron Commander involved by removing him from his appointment to send a warning to the rest to buck up. This was not done in the end because somebody was courageous enough to point out that such a remedy missed the point. The problem of the A4s was not caused by any weak squadron commander per se. The real issue was that the RSAF as a whole had expanded too quickly in the late 70s and early 80s and nobody had grasped that the training and engineering resources devoted to handle this expansion was inadequate to sustain the pace of the developments.

A more recent example was the spate of Human Factor (HF) incidents in Peace Carvin II (PCII) last year. We carried out the necessary investigations and corrective actions after the incidents. Clearly, in all the incidents, the individual pilots could have done better; and should have done better. But it is also true that something deeper had happened without the RSAF having taken a conscious decision. When PCII was first set up, it was intended for high-end training and given its challenging conditions, the RSAF sent only experienced pilots there. As time passed however, this changed and the focus of PCII was enlarged. This was reflected in the posting plans. We started to send junior pilots straight to PCII a few years ago. This decision was not wrong per se but we could have done better if we had focused on what framework was needed to allow us to induct pilots from Flying Training School (FTS) to PCII. Otherwise, it would not be a surprise if some of our junior pilots were not equipped to cope with the demanding conditions at the detachment. This issue is not yet totally resolved; Air Operations Department (AOD) and Air Combat Command (ACC) would be looking into it.

I share these two stories because they illustrate how our corrective actions can be incomplete if we focus only on the incidents and immediate causes. The fundamental problem in both cases was not the lack of operational leadership or discipline at the unit level, but a failure to appreciate the context and conditions under which our people operate. The RSAF is now undergoing a major change comparable to that of the late 70s and early 80s. We have shown great courage and conviction in undertaking to build the 3rd Generation Air Force, but we must learn from the lessons of the 80s and focus our efforts on managing transformation. This cannot be done by looking at safety narrowly. We need to take the Eastern medicine approach and look at the impact on safety from our organisational structure, resources and culture respectively. Only then can we have solutions pervasive enough to tackle safety deeply, for the long term, and at the heart of our daily operations.

Eastern Approach - Organisational Structure, Resources and Culture

• Organisational Structure

When we first started our organisational restructuring, some of us were worried that shifting the focus of the Operational Commanders to task development would dilute attention to the development of type competencies. This dilution would in turn compromise safety in the longer term because it could cause our operators to be lacking in strong fundamentals. In current operations, with our Operational Commanders now looking at the task level and no longer focusing on flying and safety, the supervision levels over the squadrons may also be reduced, which could immediately and directly affect safety adversely.

Despite initial worries that re-organisation would dilute attention to the development of type competencies and thus compromise safety, there is a growing realisation that re-organisation can actually complement safety.
In reality however, I think some of us have slowly come to a realisation that our re-organisation can actually complement safety. The Operational Commanders may have to focus at the higher task level but type competencies have not been compromised. Unlike the previous Base Commanders or Base S3s who had quite diverse responsibilities, the Type Group Commanders dedicate their attention almost entirely to type competencies and training. The feedback I have received from the helicopter squadrons which have operated with the Type Group structure for the last nine months is that the degree of oversight on flying and standards provided by the Group structure is in fact stronger than in the old air base structure.

Let me use yet another football analogy to explain what I mean. Liverpool Football Club would not want their team manager to also be the facilities manager because that would dilute his focus on building a strong football team. Hence, Benitez is not expected by any sensible football fan to look after Anfield Stadium or the football pitch. Well, in addition, Benitez as the team manager is also not expected to be deeply involved in the coaching of the basic footballing skills of his players. Most English Premier League teams have coaches in addition to the team managers. The coaches take care of fundamental football skills and techniques and fitness, while the manager takes care of team selection and strategy. It is the same philosophy behind our re-organisation efforts. The Type Group Commanders take charge of core fundamental skills, while the Operational Commanders take care of how to combine different vocations into an operational team. Under the old air base structure, the Base Commander was in charge of everything - he was the team manager, the coach, and the stadium manager. He basically ended up not being good at any of this. On the one hand, he neglected task competence, and on the other, he was also not able to focus as much on type competence as the current Type Group Commanders can.

The other concern we have with our re-organisation is the issue of group insularity. One of the strong points in the fighter and transport communities previously was the diversity of views amongst the different fighter and transport pilots spread across three air bases. Grouping all the fighters and transports within one group can potentially stifle this healthy diversity. The implications on safety are real, even if not obvious. If the entire fighter or transport community believes there is only one correct way of conducting the mission, of flying the aircraft, or of the balance between mission and safety imperatives, there will only be one perspective in the whole of the RSAF. In the investigation of the Apache accident two years ago for example, I was surprised and disappointed that the helicopter community appeared to have only one view - the Sembawang Air Base view. When I asked some senior helicopter pilots within AOD for their views, they repeated the views of Sembawang completely. And our concern when we grouped the fighter and transport squadrons together was that this insularity in the helicopter community may in future happen to the fighter and transport communities too. Such insularity is unhealthy. Tensions and diversity of opinion is what brings an organisation forward whether in operational development or safety.

We have therefore ensured that in our re-organisation, check-and-balance mechanisms are created to mitigate this risk. For many years, the Air Force Inspectorate (AFI) has provided a healthy tension with the Formations to ensure that safety is not traded off for other considerations. But we have never had an independent agency to look after training and operational standards. As part of our re-organisation, we have thus set up the Standards Office in the Specialist Staff Group of AOD, to offer alternate views and maintain a healthy check-and-balance with the Type Groups. In the same way that our logistics technicians ensure that our aircraft are airworthy, the Standards Office acts as our standards technicians, checking our people’s fundamentals to ensure they are mission-ready. Its relationship to the Type Groups is akin to that of a coach and player. Even the best players, such as Tiger Woods, employ a coach to improve themselves because the coach can see things about them that they themselves cannot see, no matter how good a player they are. The RSAF must therefore ensure that we post the right people and give the right incentives for staffing the Standards Office. Air Manpower Department (AMD) and AOD would have to work to ensure this is true for the longer term.

In sum, our re-organisation efforts are not incompatible with safety. The creation of the Standards Office and the Type Groups supplements our existing safety structures. The building of type and task competencies is not a zero sum game. We can achieve task competencies without diluting our type competencies. To return to the medicine analogy, looking at strengthening the body in a holistic way through Chinese medicine is like using our organisational restructuring to set the conditions at the RSAF level under which individual operators work. If the conditions are not well set, individual operators would be working under greater odds to achieve high standards of operations and safety. In the same way, if a person’s overall psychological and emotional health is poor, he would obviously have a higher chance of catching diseases and a lesser chance of fighting successfully against them.

• Organisational Resources

Resources determine whether we have sufficient capacity to pay attention to safety. This means at the leadership level, sufficient oversight; and at the operator level, the presence of mind, mental alertness and vigilance to handle situations that could be developing in a dangerous way. Thus, while we transformed, we have ensured that we do not dilute the resources dedicated to safety. In terms of the oversight on safety, AFI has established that after our organisational restructuring, we have in fact a higher number of safety appointment holders than before.

Removing unnecessary processes and regulations will not only improve work experience, but also help to optimise resources in a way that facilitates the RSAF to transform safely.
We have also sought to optimise our resources by cutting down on doing the unnecessary. CARDINAL frees up resources in a way that would enhance safety. Since its inception last year, we have reiterated time and again the need to right-size our training and doctrine, and eliminate unnecessary work processes and regulations. Many of you have surfaced useful suggestions that your units and formations have taken up. This is important because creating capacity has to be a top-down as well as ground-up process. By doing your part to remove unnecessary processes and regulations, you would not only improve your own work experience, but also help to optimise our resources in a way that facilitates us to transform safely.

A less obvious but equally crucial way in which CARDINAL enhances safety is its focus on the quality of our human resource. This is the quality of our people, at both the leadership and operator levels. I spoke last year about the importance of leadership in enhancing safety, by ensuring proper follow through, making right decisions, enforcing standards and setting the tone for the rest. I also said that what was really important was not so much experience per se but expertise; that it was important to have people who are expert in what they are doing. When a person is an expert, he will not only be good, but also safe at what he is doing. CARDINAL hence emphasises not only the importance of grooming, but also the selection of the right people for a job. More than just helping to realise our people's potential, it ensures that we place competent people in the positions that can affect safety in the rest of the organisation. And in addition to choosing the right leaders, CARDINAL also reinforces safety by emphasising the need to better train, prepare and develop our operators for the future. No matter how strong a team is, individual weak links can drag the rest down. By nurturing competent people with strong core values, CARDINAL enhances safety at the operator level directly.

• Organisational Culture

Let me then talk directly and in greater depth the third factor which affects an organisation in a deep way, including its safety standards even though at first sight, this is not something that has very direct or immediate bearing on safety. This is the factor of culture. Culture is what shapes our behaviours, instincts and first reactions in response to a situation. It determines how we relate to one another and to the RSAF. Culture affects everybody and everybody has a part to play in shaping our culture. Through CARDINAL, the RSAF is trying to inculcate a culture of commitment and team spirit. If we take the Western medicine approach of looking at specific incidents, it is almost impossible to pinpoint culture as the main cause of any incident. Yet, like the Eastern medicine philosophy, the consequences of an unhealthy culture can be far more pervasive than the primary or proximate cause of any incident. This is where CARDINAL again strengthens safety. Commitment and team spirit are vital ingredients of a safe culture.

The "Engaging the Heart" thrust of CARDINAL; through CARDINAL, the RSAF seeks to inculcate a culture of commitment and team spirit, and these efforts strengthen safety as commitment and team spirit are vital ingredients of a safe culture.
CARDINAL aims to build commitment to Singapore, the SAF, the RSAF and to one another. We want to instil the idea that not only do we belong to the Air Force; the Air Force belongs to each and every one of us. We can all take pride when the Air Force does well, such as when we responded professionally to intercept the unidentified Cessna, or when we put up good shows at the National Day Parade and the Singapore Airshow. It does not matter that it was not us personally getting the plaudits, because as long as the Air Force performs well, we all take pride as part of the RSAF. This is what we mean by commitment; it is the sense that we have a stake in the organisation.

CARDINAL also fosters deeper team spirit in our people. We do not want only a professional 'just-do-it' culture where all that matters is to get the job done. We want a culture where friendship thrives, where going to work is not a drag but something we can look forward to, because we find friends in the workplace and we enjoy being with our colleagues. This is an environment that encourages team and mission success over personal glory.

Commitment and team spirit enhance safety because they are what make us willing to speak up when something is wrong, to not let our friends and the RSAF down. Commitment is what makes an otherwise uninterested party concerned. When our people have such a culture and mindset of commitment and team spirit, they will go further out of their way to rectify things which are not going well. We would not close an eye if for example we see somebody else doing wrong things - whether it is in the regimental and discipline sense of misbehaving or in the sense of something potentially unsafe. The Safety Information System (SIS) would not be as effective if the only people who comment are from AFI and those in the chain of command. We have had many occasions where officers who had nothing to do with the units nonetheless raise their views passionately on the SIS. We also had Warrant Officers who shared their thoughts openly on the SIS and during air times and conferences. These are indications of a deeper sense of commitment. It is important that our people are willing to speak up on something that affects the Air Force, even if it has no impact on an individual personally. This is because the Air Force is a team. Mission success and safety depends on every individual pulling his weight regardless of rank, appointment or vocation.

A culture of team spirit also reinforces trust, open reporting and learning. If we feel as part of a team, we trust the people we are working with. We are more receptive to one another. We understand that the person raising a mistake that another serviceman has made is not doing it to be nasty or to score cheap points off him, but to ensure that the team as a whole does better. Team spirit allows open reporting to be accepted for the good of one another and for the team. This trust in turn complements the checks-and-balances in our organisational structure. Having our friends constantly watching over us ensures that we do not become complacent or desensitised to the possible hazards. In addition, open reporting provides the basis for the RSAF to learn as an organisation. It allows us to build up a store of knowledge from where we can learn the mistakes of someone else without needing to go through the experience ourselves.

Finally, a culture of trust with our bosses and subordinates leads to less micro-management, more empowerment, less second-guessing of bosses and a greater willingness and ability to make difficult decisions. Less micro-management means less stress and less duplication of work. People can then channel their energies towards the real tasks at hand. Moreover, as I have said on the SIS, the Air Force operates in a time-critical environment where split-second decisions are often needed to arrest deteriorating situations. We will not make effective decisions if our first instinct in a situation is to think of how to answer for our actions after the event, or if our first instinct is to second-guess our bosses. A climate of trust with our bosses and subordinates prevents this from happening. A climate of trust and not second-guessing our bosses means that we know that unless we do stupid things, our bosses would support our actions. This means that each level is empowered to dare to make decisions.

Thus, commitment, team spirit, open reporting, trust, learning and safety are all mutually reinforcing. But three recent incidents suggest that we still have some way to go before achieving this desired culture. In one case, a F16 carried out a roller when the clearance was for overshoot, and in another, there was a potential confliction in a circuit. Then, there was a padlock unaccounted for during the end-of-day checks in a fighter squadron. But in all three cases, the incidents were not reported until AFI found out about them. The sharing of incidents must be done timely and proactively. It is only when our people are committed and imbued with a good team spirit that we can openly share and learn from the lessons of our colleagues, so that the Air Force as a whole benefits. CARDINAL has given us the impetus and avenues to build a culture of commitment and team spirit. It is now up to every one of us to do our part to shape this culture.

Western Approach

Before I end, let me say a few words on the Western medicine approach towards safety. This approach of looking at specific incidents has served the RSAF well for many years and it must continue. In the same way that Western medicine often readily cures our sickness, focusing on specific incidents ensures that the causes and symptoms of safety incidents are tackled immediately. We must thus continue to take all incidents seriously, examine them thoroughly, learn the right lessons, and implement the safeguards to ensure that they are not repeated. And it should not be misconstrued that the Eastern medicine philosophy of treating the well-being of the RSAF as a whole implies that individual errors can be rationalised away. No matter how strong a body Chinese medicine can build up for us, one would be silly to think he can stand in front of a moving car. No matter how good the RSAF system is, every individual can still be a weak link and cause accidents. We will continue to demand standards and if there is a need to mete out punishment, it will still be done.

Conclusion

To conclude, having a good safety record gives us the confidence that our transformation is on the right track. But transforming successfully also allows us to strengthen safety in the longer term. Moving forward, we must combine the Western and Eastern medicine approaches towards safety. Western medicine can cure us as each disease appears, but Eastern medicine will protect and preserve our health for the long term. Moreover Eastern medicine produces a strong body that can react better than any Western medicine approach to tackle an attack from a disease. Similarly, if our transformation efforts can build a robust organisational structure, properly allocate our resources and strengthen our culture as a whole, we would be in a better position to apply the safety tools we have painstakingly built up over the years to tackle each safety incident as it arises. The effects of our transformation may not all be apparent yet but I am confident that it will leave behind a strong safety legacy to the next generation.

MG Ng Chee Khern assumed his current appointment as Chief of Air Force on 24 Mar 06. A qualified F-16 and F-5 Fighter Pilot, he has served as Director of Joint Operations and Planning Directorate, Chief of Staff (Air Staff) and Commander of Tengah Air Base. MG Ng is a President's Scholar and SAF Overseas Scholar. He graduated with a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, and a Master of Arts Degree from University of Oxford, U.K., and attained a Master in Public Administration from Harvard University, U.S.A. MG Ng has also attended the prestigious Air Command and Staff College in the U.S.A. For his significant contributions to Singapore and the SAF, MG Ng was awarded the Public Administration Medal (Gold)(Military) in 2005.
Last updated on 11 Jun 2008
 
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