Background

In the wake of the 26 Dec 04 earthquake and tsunami that wreaked destruction on an unprecedented scale, the SAF launched its largest ever humanitarian relief operation. More than 1500 SAF personnel were deployed – to Phuket in Thailand , and to 3 locations in Indonesia : Medan , Banda Aceh and Meulaboh. The SAF also carried supply and support missions to Jakarta , Singapore and Aceh, and around the Indian Ocean rim to Phuket , Sri Lanka , the Maldives and Mauritius.

Singapore was one of the first countries to send personnel, vehicles and relief supplies to the devastated sites in Sumatra . Over the next three weeks, SAF Chinook and Super Puma helicopters as well as C-130 and Fokker 50 aircraft flew some 250 missions, carrying more than one million pounds of cargo and 4,000 people. Three helicopter landing ships and fast craft ferried relief supplies, non-governmental agencies’ (NGO) personnel and volunteers. Engineering equipment were brought in to establish beach landing points and clear supply routes from the coast to the devastated city of Meulaboh . The SAF medical teams treated 4,000 people in Banda Aceh and Meulaboh.

The SAF has now successfully completed its emergency relief mission. POINTER took the opportunity to have a conversation with one of the key players involved in this major humanitarian effort. We are pleased to present our interview with BG Goh Kee Nguan, the SAF Contingent Commander for Operation Flying Eagle.

For the benefit of POINTER readers, could you explain your role and mission in the SAF relief operations in Indonesia in the aftermath of the tsunami disaster?

The mission of the SAF was to provide emergency relief to the people, who were affected by the tsunami disaster. This was done in support of the Indonesian efforts. As the contingent commander, my role was first to synchronise the efforts of the various task forces in Medan, Banda Aceh and Meulaboh to achieve the mission assigned by the SAF. Secondly, as the commander of the force, my priority was to look after our men and women and ensured that all of them return home safely.

What were your impressions and thoughts on the situation in the initial days of your arrival at Medan and after surveying the situation in Banda Aceh and Meulaboh?

The scale of devastation that we saw on the ground was beyond what we could ever imagine. It was hard for us to visualise the extent of the damages until we were physically on the ground, where we could see and smell the impact of the disaster. Besides the physical damages, the impact on the people of Aceh was also beyond what words could describe.

The impact from this initial impression hit us hard. But it also hardened our resolve to do our best to help the people of Indonesia . Rather than simply providing humanitarian assistance, we realised that it was important that we utilised our resources to provide relevant and timely help to the victims, and to add significant value to the whole relief operation, whenever possible.

Through this experience, I also learned that it is important for commanders to go to the ground to see and have a better assessment of ground situation. This helped our commanders to establish contact and to get to know the various stakeholders. In addition, we also needed to expose our staff to the actual ground situation so that they would be more connected to the ground when they performed their job.

We understand that you were based in Medan for the period of the SAF operations in Indonesia . Could you enlighten us how the relief operations in Meulaboh and Banda Aceh were coordinated from the nerve centre in Medan ?

I had my main headquarters in Medan to control, coordinate and support the entire operations in N. Sumatra. My command group also spent time on the ground in Medan and travelled very often to Banda Aceh and Meulaboh to meet our people as well as talked to other stakeholders there. In all these locations, our people worked closely with the Indonesian authorities, other foreign military forces, UN agencies, NGOs, and international organisations in support of the relief effort.

The approach to coordinating this operation was done in two stages. Firstly, we tried to make a realistic and accurate assessment of ground needs through dialogues, sharing of information and ground visits. Secondly, our operational HQ in Medan , led by my deputy, would coordinate the assistance required and ensured that they reached the right people and the right place on a timely basis. Depending on the urgency of issues, we could either call Medan immediately so that issues could be resolved straightaway if they were urgent. Or, we could do it at our daily staff meeting in the evening after my ground visits. In short, our command group were the ‘eyes and ears’ to interact with the people, and to get a better feel of the ground while the HQ in Medan supported the operations and ensured all process loops were closed.

What were the key challenges faced by SAF personnel in the execution of the relief operations in Indonesia and how were these resolved?

There were a few key challenges that we faced during this operation. Initially, it was the lack of information. Communications were down and there was little information on the situation after the tsunami. The Internet became the key source of information for us initially. Therefore we decided to send in our personnel into Aceh early on 29 th Dec. Our people were instrumental in providing critical information that helped us decide how we should proceed in the operation in the initial stage. For example, we could make fairly accurate decision on the type of capabilities and supplies to be loaded on our first Landing Ship Tank. With updated information, besides enhancing our operation, we were also able to help others by facilitating their subsequent access into Aceh.

With better and more updated information, we were also able to synchronise our operation more effectively. For example, with the relief effort in Meulaboh, we identified what Meulaboh needed and brought in supplies from Banda Aceh and Medan . If none were available in the theatre, we would coordinate to get the supplies from Singapore . It was important to bring in supplies according to the people’s needs based on the changing conditions. For example, at the beginning, body bags and gloves were needed. While at a later stage, milk powder and fuel were needed. Our challenge was to bring in the relevant supplies to the needy people at the right time.

The second challenge that we faced was working with numerous other people in the relief operation. Besides the Indonesian people and authorities, there were many other foreign military forces, UN agencies, NGOs and international organisations. The local and international media were also present in Aceh. Our challenge was to work out who they were, what they were there for, who was in charge and how to work together to help the victims of the disaster.

Our third challenge was in trying to make sense of the chaotic situation and decide how we could best help in the relief operation. When we realised the extent of the devastation, we knew a major undertaking was required. We had to decide what to do and how to scope our work properly. We wanted to make sure that the resources or expertise that we brought in were relevant and could value add to the relief effort.

How did we go about getting this clarity to overcome the challenge?

Firstly, we sent our people into Aceh early to get a first hand assessment of the actual ground situation. Secondly, our many years of engagement and strong relationship with the Indonesians were critical in facilitating our work in this operation. There was mutual trust and understanding. We were able to work closely together to size up the situation and ensured that the appropriate assistance was rendered to the people in need. In addition, being able to understand Bahasa Indonesia and being sensitive to the Indonesian culture and people, our people were able to go to the ground and interact with the locals to understand what they needed most so that we could provide precise humanitarian assistance to them.

You have given us some insights into how we organised our operations. I gather that in such an operation, it is important to send a ‘flyaway’ team to the ground at the shortest notice to gather information and apprise the situation. We then have to configure our immediate response in terms of providing immediate relief to stabilise the situation which would then be followed by the main response after we have gathered sufficient information and established the command and control system.

Yes, in a crisis situation like this, time was of essence, and we should send in assistance as soon as possible. So we really could not wait for the situation to be crystal clear before we took action. There were certain capabilities such as providing medical aid and transportation that were usually needed in such crises. These could be projected together with the assessment team. Once we became clearer about the situation and the assessment team had identified other needs, we could then calibrate further and push in more relevant assistance. Air transportation was the fastest way to move supplies, but it had limited capacity. So it was important that we prioritised urgent and critical supplies to go by air while others could go by sea.

Was there an issue with the morale of SAF personnel in Indonesia given the scale of devastation, grief, fatigue and difficult living conditions, and if so, what was done about it?

Despite working under demanding and challenging conditions, our people remained very motivated throughout the operation. One key reason was because we all went into this operation with a clear purpose in mind i.e., to save lives and deliver hope to the people who were affected by the tsunami and earthquake. As a commander, I could not ask for more. Our people were all self-driven and many demonstrated outstanding initiatives in their area of work. The only challenge for commanders was to continue to scope our work to ensure that they were relevant and meaningful. As a precaution, we also took necessary steps to prepare our people psychologically before, during and after the operation. From our surveys and dialogues with our people, there was only one concern. Our people missed their homes because they could not talk to their families initially as the main communications were down.

Given that you had to deal with a diverse group of nationalities and organisations both civilian and military, how did you manage to reconcile their different needs and interests?

Although the groups were diverse, all of us shared a common goal, which was to help the victims of the tsunami disaster. This common goal served to align our interests and helped in facilitating and integrating our relief efforts.

The SAF was able to respond swiftly to the tsunami disaster. In your opinion, what do you think contributed to our ability to react quickly and effectively?

There were a few reasons for this. Firstly, it was our high standards of training and operational readiness. Our years of rigorous training in joint and integrated conventional operations was instrumental in ensuring that elements from across the three Services in the SAF could be quickly configured and launched smoothly into operations as an integrated force to support the relief operation. We maintained a high level of operational readiness during peacetime and this allowed us to mobilise our resources and launched into the operation in a very short time during a crisis like this.

However, I want to add that the primary mission of the SAF has always been and will continue to be: to ensure the security of Singapore . For Operation Flying Eagle, since we did not have a standing force for humanitarian-type operations, we had to configure a force from scratch, brought in what we assessed were relevant capabilities and launched into theatre quickly. What was clear to us was that some of our conventional capabilities like medical, transportation and logistics support could be deployed to support Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Recovery (HADR) operations. More importantly, our people were able to quickly adapt what they learnt in conventional operations and apply themselves well in a HADR operation.

Another reason, which was very critical, was our many years of engagement with our counterparts in the Indonesian military. The visits, bilateral exercises and other forms of interaction over the years have helped us to develop mutual understanding and trust, not only at the armed forces level but also at the individual level. For example, I have worked with MG Bambang Darmono, Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) Special Task Force previously for about four years. While COL Tan Chuan Jin, our support group commander in Meulaboh, had just returned from his stint as the Army Attache in Jakarta , and LTC Tay Boon Khai, our medical team commander in Banda Aceh, was a graduate of SESKOAD (Indonesian Army Commander and Staff College ). Such relationship, trust and understanding were crucial in facilitating a smooth and close cooperation between our two armed forces during this operation. In fact, we were working like brothers.

Without doubt, leadership was also an important factor in enabling SAF personnel to fulfil their challenging relief mission in Indonesia . How do you see leadership being expressed at the various levels of our people during this operation? As you visited the troops on the ground, did you see exemplary instances of personal leadership expressed at the different levels?

There were three key areas on leadership that I’d like to share. Firstly, in an operation like this where there was little information and lots of uncertainties, our leaders must have a clear understanding of the intent and purpose of the mission. This way, they would be able to identify opportunities and take necessary actions to render the appropriate assistance. Secondly, it was crucial for our leaders to be physically present on the ground to have a first hand feel of the situation and to exert direct influence on the ground operation. Our commanders must be with our people to know what was going on, to assess how our men were doing and how we could help them or influence the situation in order to do relevant and meaningful work and achieve the desired outcome. Thirdly, besides being able to lead the operations competently and effectively, our leaders must be capable of interacting and working with the various stakeholders in the operation e.g. the Indonesian authorities, other military forces, UN agencies, NGOs and international organisations.

During this operation, not only our leaders but our men and women at every level, demonstrated lots of initiative while doing their work to facilitate the relief operations. One thing that impressed me most was the behaviour of our people towards the disaster victims. We were clear that we were there to help and support the Indonesians in their relief effort. This manifested itself at different levels in the way our people interacted with the Indonesians, both military and civilians. Our people showed sensitivity towards the locals and treated them with dignity and respect. This way, we were able to work closely with the Indonesians to bring in direct and relevant assistance.

Last but not least, what valuable lessons have you learnt from our Indonesian friends in dealing with arguably the worst disaster to have happened in living memory?

During this operation, the most valuable lesson that I learnt was about the strength of the human spirit, especially the Acehnese. It was both humbling and motivating for me to see how fast the Acehnese managed to get back on their feet, and quickly brought normalcy back into their lives, after going through such a major disaster. By the time we left, the markets in both Banda Aceh and Meulaboh were in full operation. Even the taxi service in Banda Aceh was running. The people of Aceh really demonstrated strong resolve and determination.

Another lesson was the importance of peacetime engagement. The strong relationship and understanding that we established as a result of our many years of engagement with our neighbours and partners were crucial in facilitating our efforts during this operation. We also learnt from other stakeholders how they were organised for crisis management, in terms of the structures and processes, and how they established and coordinated their relief efforts.

Although we had hoped that the disaster did not happen, we were glad that we were able to do our part to help in the relief effort by saving lives and delivering hope to those who were affected by the tsunami.

Lastly, to those who participated in Operation Flying Eagle and to those supported us from Singapore , I salute you and thank you for your dedicated effort and unwavering support.