The aftershocks of OIF still rumble through the world today. Even with the hand-over of power to the Iraqis, news on Iraq feature in the headlines daily. Perhaps the US and the Coalition miscalculated their strategic objectives. Perhaps their plans were the best possible with the limited information available to them. Even as that debate rages, it is still instructive to review the operational perspectives of this latest war.

Air Power in OIF was reflective of the much-touted Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Cutting edge technology was married to revolutionary concepts, giving rise to advances in the RMA areas of Precision Strike and Information Dominance. Yet in other ways, OIF was more than the RMA. The use of Air Power in OIF also reflected military principles that have been espoused since Sun Tze. This article aims to highlight how Air Power in OIF reflects the RMA, as well as how Air Power in OIF also validated age-old military principles. Finally, the article will attempt to draw relevant lessons for the RSAF.

Broad Brush of Air Power in OIF

OIF was really the second chapter of Desert Storm. While Desert Storm successfully removed Iraqi presence from Kuwait , it left the bulk of the Iraqi war machine intact. By one estimate, the Iraqi Armed Forces was 60% intact. OIF was also different from other wars because Ops Southern Focus formed a pre-amble that allowed the US and Coalition to shape the battlefield even before the war started. While Southern Focus was ostensibly part of Southern Watch operations to deal with an increase in Iraqi attacks on Coalition aircraft, it also provided the opportunity to systematically degrade the Iraqi air defense system prior to the initiation of a Coalition invasion. The Southern Focus responses were specifically aimed at anti-aircraft artillery sites, surface-to-air missile sites, early warning radar sites and command-and-control facilities. The attacks on Iraqi command and control also included precision attacks on the Iraqi fibre-optic cable network, which the Iraqis used to keep southern Iraq in communication with Baghdad .

All these set the stage for OIF, which began on March 19 2003 with a leadership “decapitation strike”. Though the strike as executed targeted only Saddam, it was reported that the initial plan was to destroy the top 55 members of the Iraqi leadership. This leadership strike demonstrated the strategic possibilities of Air Power, just as Warden had theorised that the enemy’s C4I was the most important and protected element in his five-ring model.

With Air Power’s reach and speed, high-value strategic targets, including leadership targets, can be hit within the first hours of war. This leadership strike was part of the Effects-Based Operations (EBO) concept, which advocates precise and focused application of force to key elements of the enemy’s war machinery to achieve wide effects far beyond the mere tonnage of bombs.

Another example of EBO was the bombing of Saddam's palaces and ministries in Baghdad even as the ground troops started their manoeuvres. The spectacle was designed to convince the Iraqi people that the Iraqi leadership enjoyed no sanctuary, and that it was safe to overthrow the regime.

In the subsequent hours of the campaign, more than 2500 bombs and missiles were unleashed against air defence sites, surface-to-surface missile sites and artillery positions. This kick-started the widely-labelled “shock and awe” campaign where critical military infrastructure was demolished and Iraqi ground forces pummelled. It is interesting to note that “shock and awe” existed only in the eyes of the global media viewing the unrelenting tempo of operations. One of the leading "shock and awe" theorists, Harlan Ullman, said afterwards that they did not properly implement his theory (which calls for basically devastating the enemy country to the point where it's no longer capable of functioning as a society), and that the air campaign actually looked very much like something out of a standard air superiority textbook. Yet in no previous war had Air Power been used so clinically and with such regard to collateral damage. In fact, reflecting the EBO approach, when US and British troops entered southern Iraq a day ahead of schedule, hundreds of bridges, rail lines, power stations and other facilities, once considered potential targets, were spared to preserve infrastructure for a speedier post-war recovery. “Architects of the strategy said they believed that by focusing the first strikes on Hussein's palaces, security operations, intelligence services and Baath party buildings, the protective screen around the Iraqi leader could be removed and his downfall precipitated.”

Once it became clear that the regime was not going to crumble as hoped for, the air campaign shifted focus to the Republican Guard forces, especially those protecting Baghdad . Even as the ground forces paused during the last week of March to refuel, refit and wait for sandstorms to blow over, the air strikes on the Republican Guard continued unabated. “By April 4, U.S. Army intelligence estimated the Medina Division had been reduced to 18 percent of its full strength. The Hammurabi Division was rated at 44 percent.” As the US Army and Marines were moving towards Baghdad , air commanders developed a special concept for close-air support in a large urban area by “stacking different types of warplanes with varying munitions over the city to provide multiple attack options.” In fact, Air Power literally brought a different dimension into urban land warfare. Airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) provided an unprecedented level of situational awareness, while combat aircraft were able to make full use of open areas typical of modern cities. However, the success of urban close air support within the heart of Baghdad is still uncertain. Reports of dust and tall buildings interfering with laser-guided bombs are mixed with examples of innovations, like using inert bombs to minimise collateral damage.

Air Power also played a critical role in opening a second front in Northern Iraq . While not to downplay the importance of Special Forces, Air Power was critical in support of the lighter-armed Special Forces, especially when pitted against regular forces. Task Force Devil, for example, encountered problems in dealing with Iraqi artillery in an operation near the Kurdish Security Zone when air support was not immediately available.

Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in OIF

Though the importance of Air Power to OIF is obvious when going through a broad overview of the campaign, it is equally important to examine the campaign for clues to future trends. An important area to consider is the RMA. It would be useful to see if the trends postulated by military thinkers in the 1990s continue to play out in OIF.

The one area that reflects best the RMA at work is Precision Strike. Certainly Precision Strike is not new. Footage of Laser Guided Bombs (LGBs) impacting through selected windows of Iraqi buildings in Desert Storm have been played and replayed over CNN. Comparisons were made between the tonnage of bombs required to hit World War 2 targets vs the relatively small number of sorties required per target in Desert Storm.

However, there was some resistance against such new technology. Surely, according to the naysayers, this would come saddled with high logistical and maintenance costs – it appeared too good to be true. “Operational evidence from the Gulf War has also indicated that the complexities involved in the equipment and components associated with modern weapon systems have reduced rather than enhanced reliability. Moreover, the Gulf War demonstrates an increasing need for redundancy and a voracious appetite for munitions.” However, there is nothing like a challenge to trigger human ingenuity. In 1992, the JDAM project started with an ambitious goal of US$40000 per precision guidance kit. In 2002, the price was around US$20000, half the goal and a small fraction of the price of any previous guided weapon.

The trend of increasing precision munitions usage looks set to continue. In fact, at a conference on the future of airpower held by the Royal United Services institute (RUSI) in London last year, leading academics said that the trend toward Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) would continue. Not only would the proportion of PGMs increase, judging by the new weapons fielded in OIF (CBU-105 WCMD and AGM-86D CALCM), the lethality of PGMs would also increase. When compared to the other areas of the RMA, like Information Dominance, Precision Strike seems to offer the most “bang for the buck”.

Certainly the speed of the war reflects elements of Information Dominance. “In half the time of the 1991 Persian Gulf War , US forces flushed Saddam and thousands of his stalwarts from power – a far more difficult mission than merely evicting the Iraqi Army from Kuwait ”. The ground forces were able to advance quickly, bypassing whole divisions, because they had a good picture of the Iraqi forces’ disposition throughout the country while the Iraqis did not have a clue beyond visual range. Yet this Information Dominance was only possible due to an array of ISR and C4I assets and the necessary satellite bandwidth that enabled the transmission of video and imagery real-time. Add to that the necessary expertise to manage the systems and analyse imagery, Information Dominance appears much harder to achieve than Precision Strike. The comparative difficulty of achieving Information Dominance commends Precision Strike as the silver bullet for many air forces in the world.

Timeless Principles of Air Power

While it is tempting to play up all the new technology in OIF, it is important to examine how the technology was employed. By nature we have an aversion to change, contributing to what Robert Heilbroner calls the “inertia of history” – the tendency of people to repeat and continue their way of doing things as long as possible. New technology could have been employed in the same old ‘conventional’ manner. The innovation in employment of new technology in OIF reflected age-old military wisdom, principles that all military strategists should take note of regardless of the technological state of their militaries.

As Sun Tze said, “Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.” The US employed new operational concepts that maximized the promise of precision munitions.

First, the implementation of the Time Sensitive Targeting (TST) Cell within the Combined Air Ops Centre (CAOC) enabled the prosecution of fleeting targets like Terrorists, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Leadership Targets. While the individual technology enablers of ISR, Command, Control and Communications (C3) and Precision Strike were available, it took the creation of the processes and structure to merge them into a lethal combat capability. These processes enabled the US to strike Saddam’s place of meeting at a restaurant, taking only 12 minutes from the CIA passing coordinates to bomb detonation.

Second, joint doctrine and training was put in place to maximise the contribution of Air Power to the land battle. Although precision munitions allowed more lethal attacks closer to own troops, it took additional equipment (to give laser or GPS targeting capability), doctrine changes and joint training to end up with the integrated Close Air Support (CAS) picture described below:

“If you check into the CAS stack you may be working with a Marine in an F-18 or Navy crew in an F-14 or an Air Force pilot in an A-10. You won't know the difference. You'll just know the call sign and the location. So I think that's another wonderful testimony to joint training, joint doctrine, joint CAS, and being able to work the command and control to get the airplanes up there.”

Third, while GPS guided JDAMs promised all-weather capability, it took the fusion of ISR assets, like JSTARs, into the precision targeting process to enable true all-weather strikes. Even as ground forces ground to a halt in sand storms, the air strikes continued unabated.

All these serve to disprove the comments of a senior officer in the PLA, “The experts of our Army (PLA) hold the view that in its bid to conduct this military revolution, the US will encounter obstructions from all sides, especially obstructions from the US Army itself. The military revolution which the US Army is engaged in is no more than the use of information technology to transform the existing units as well as existing weaponry and equipment of the Army, and the US Army has already got trapped in the blind alley of technology. In the words of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Air Force Gen. Richard Myers, “… you’re seeing a transformation of a sort. The equipment is the equipment we have had for years. But the difference is how well integrated all the capabilities of the services are in this case. All you have to do is look back, you can even look back at Afghanistan and see it is different than it was. Certainly look back at the first Gulf War…”

un Tzu also said, “In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good… Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.” 

OIF attempted to achieve this at two different levels. At the strategic level, OIF targeted the leadership structure (and in particular Saddam) as the key-stone, without which the entire regime would crumble. OIF also attempted to incite the populace to revolt against the regime by destroying symbols of authority like Saddam's palaces, security operations, intelligence services and Baath party buildings. At the operational level, a relatively high effort was placed on Psychological Operations (PsyOp). A total of 32 million leaflets were dropped in 158 sorties. A total of 58 sorties were flown by Commando Solo broadcasting a total of 610 hours of TV and Radio. In the first use of Compass Call in the PysOp role, a total of 125 Compass Call sorties were flown. All these were directed towards encouraging Iraqi Commanders and soldiers to stop fighting for the regime. By some accounts, the Republican Guard generally fled when US ground troops approached, suggesting that the PsyOp efforts were at least partially successful.

Observations for the RSAF

After all that is said about OIF, it is necessary to piece together the imperatives for the RSAF drawn from this campaign.

It seems that the RMA trend will continue. However, we do not want to just hop on to the bandwagon. We have to think through the implications of the RMA on our unique security situation. Precision Strike may be the easiest way to go forward but it also means that potential enemies will also likely possess capabilities in Precision Strike. On the other hand, it may be prudent for the RSAF to leverage on existing advantages in system capability by focussing on other RMA areas, such as Information Dominance. Such RMA areas would provide the impetus for the RSAF to tackle the next ‘S’ curve of capability development so as to widen the existing capability gap.

Of the new operating concepts, EBO appears to be a concept that is here to stay. And it also seems to be a partial validation of van Creveld’s theory that conflict between large-scale conventional forces between state and state have already come to an end. Nevertheless, targeting strategic leadership and key installations could be a task that the air force, with its reach and precision, is tailor-made for. Air Power is, without a doubt, flexible enough to deliver the effects that EBO intends.

In the same vein, Time-Sensitive Targeting vastly increases the options of targeting for the RSAF. The potential for the RSAF to reap the benefits of TST is considerable, given the level of interconnectivity of its architecture through its investment in network-centric warfare, as well as the high level of computer literacy among its population. This would greatly shorten the sensor-to-shooter loops in the targeting process and deny the shoot-and-scoot tactics of any enemy. Obviously intelligence would have a major role to play in order for TST to succeed.

However, it is the integration of all the capabilities of the RSAF, and of the SAF as a whole, which will drive the ultimate transformation of the fighting force . Whether it is inter-service integration or the integration of technology, OIF has shown that the need to fight the enemy as a single force is greater than ever. It is about the whole being greater than the sum of its parts. And network-centricity and interoperability are the keys to an integrated force.

Lest we become too enamoured with attractive new RMA terms and concepts, we have to build a foundation based on proven principles of Air Power. Perhaps the most important principle is that we need to “let our methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances”. RSAF doctrine should not become a stumbling block to effective employment of new technology. In fact, new technology should not even be the key driver for our operational concepts. We have to take the entire security tapestry into consideration, weighing threat capabilities and our desired outcomes. With the end-game in mind, we should then develop operational concepts to meet that end-game. These operational concepts should then drive technology acquisition and development.
Finally, the Air Power lessons of OIF ought to be taken in context. If the only Super-Power in the world were not involved, the results may be different. The RSAF must take each leaf from this book and apply it in our own unique context in order to make it work for us.

Conclusion

OIF is important not only as a historical milestone but also because the curtain has yet to be drawn on the final scene of OIF. Yet, OIF presents an interesting study in the employment of Air Power, as well as validating trends in the RMA. OIF also serves to remind us of timeless military and Air Power principles. The RSAF should take heed of the lessons of OIF so that we can be better positioned to transform into a World Class People, First Class Air Force.

A chronology of the six-week invasion of Iraq , drawn from the FRONTLINE documentary

March 6
Two weeks before he would launch the invasion of Iraq , President Bush announces at a press conference that time is running out on the UN inspections process and on Saddam Hussein

March 17
President Bush delivers his final ultimatum: "Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to go will result in military conflict commenced at a time of our choosing."

Coalition troops, massed in the Persian Gulf on the eve of the invasion, fully expect an Iraqi chemical attack as they near Baghdad . 200,000 ground troops, almost all of them American and British, are backed by an armada of ships in the Gulf and hundreds of Navy and Air Force warplanes.

At the insistence of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the ground force is only half the size of the force that ejected Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991.

March 19
Zero hour. The coalition plans to begin the invasion with a spectacular opening "decapitation" strike, targeting the top 55 men in the Iraqi leadership. But in Washington there is a sudden change of plans -- CIA chief George Tenet has received a tip on where Saddam Hussein would be that very night. In a meeting with President Bush and the national security team, the decision is made to launch a surprise strike aimed at Saddam. The planned attacks on the full Iraqi leadership are abandoned.

Stealth bombs and cruise missiles hit the target in the grounds of the Dora Farm complex where Saddam's daughters live. But the intelligence tip is inaccurate -- Saddam is not there.

March 20
The invasion begins. General Franks's ground war plan is for the Army's 5th Corps to cross the Iraq-Kuwait border and attack Baghdad from the desert west of the Euphrates .

The Marine Corps will attack through the inhabited areas east of the river, by heading toward Nasiriya to cross the Eurphates and make a parallel advance.

The British, with support from U.S. Marines, will secure Iraq 's second city, Basra .

March 21
The coalition launches its bombing campaign in Baghdad against Saddam's palaces and ministries. The spectacle is designed to convince the Iraqi people that it is safe to overthrow the regime.
American commanders advancing across the Kuwait border report Iraqi regular forces are simply falling apart, taking off uniforms and disappearing among the civilian population.

The British reach the outskirts of Basra but are met with resistance from regular troops and the Fedayeen, a fiercely loyal militia headed by Saddam's son Uday. Saddam's most feared lieutenant commands Basra : Ali Hassan Al Majid, known as "Chemical Ali." The British close off the city but allow civilians to leave. British MI6 agents inside Basra hope they can incite an uprising. Some in the American high command are exasperated. They feel British caution makes Saddam look strong. But the British want to minimize civilian casualties.

The port of Um Qasr at the head of the Persian Gulf is captured by U.S. Marines. It's the first time since World War II that U.S. Marines are operating under British command.

March 22
By nightfall in Iraq , the forward elements of the 3rd Infantry are over 150 miles inside Iraq and roughly halfway to Baghdad .

March 23
U.S. combat operations are meeting with resistance in a number of locations, the most significant around the city of Nasiriya where U.S. Marines plan to capture two bridges to cross the Euphrates . A unit from the 507th Maintenance Company supporting the U.S. Army's advance takes a wrong turn in the pre-dawn darkness and stumbles into Nasiriya behind enemy lines. The Fedayeen strike. Eleven Americans die and seven are taken prisoner, including a badly wounded Private First Class Jessica Lynch.

In a separate attack in Nasiriya, U.S. Marines fiercely battle Iraqis. An American aircraft arrives to help but attacks the American position, adding to the casualties. Eighteen Marines die, some 50 are wounded. Many Iraqi civilians are also killed. By the end of the day a total of 29 Americans die in Nasiriya, and with them dies hope that the Iraqi people will help the coalition overthrow the regime.
In the western desert, fast-moving 5th Army troops are advancing towards four Republican Guard divisions -- perhaps 40,000 men hidden in the countryside south of Baghdad . Thirty-two Apache helicopters are ordered forward this night to search out and destroy the Guard. The Iraqis spring an ambush and intense small arms fire brings down one Apache. The rest are forced to turn back with almost every helicopter damaged. The Republican Guard is largely unscathed. Apache pilots' faith in U.S. intelligence is badly shaken.

March 24
The battle for Basra rages between the British 7th Armored Brigade and Iraqi regulars and militia. British troops pull back to avoid an expected Republican Guard ambush and they are willing to wait so as to avoid a civilian bloodbath. Their wait will last for two weeks.

March 25
In the Shiite holy city of Najaf , units of the U.S. Army's 3rd Infantry Division engage in fierce battles witlh Iraqi forces and paramilitary.

By now, there have been more setbacks: A brutal three-day sandstorm has been swirling across southern Iraq and Fedayeen fighters are leaving the cities and attacking supply lines of the lead units. Five days into the invasion, the American advance on Baghdad stalls.

Back in Washington , retired generals have been appearing on television and commenting that the war is not going as well as it should because there are not enough combat forces on the ground.

March 26
American forces encircle Najaf after several days of intense battles.

Paratroopers from the U.S. Army's 173rd Airborne Brigade land in northern Iraq to open the battle on the northern front. The 173rd and Special Operations troops begin operating with Kurdish forces in the north, calling in air strikes when Iraqi forces try to move forward.

March 28-29
The American army prepares to attack Baghdad . Lead units will have to funnel through a mile-wide gap between a lake and the city of Karbala -- the so- called Karbala Gap -- and then assault across the Euphrates towards Baghdad . A signals intercept leads to a warning alert to coalition troops -- be prepared for imminent chemical attack.

March 30
British Royal Marines launch Operation James, the single largest British operation of the war, in an effort to secure Basra .

April 1
After more than two days of a tank, artillery and plane barrage, the U.S. Army's 101 st Airborne Division begins the final securing of Najaf.

April 2
Just before dawn, members of the 3rd Infantry advance into the Karbala Gap. There is no chemical attack. Iraqi forces have pulled back because they feel too vulnerable in open desert. The Americans now begin to advance toward the Iraqis main defensive positions on the eastern bank of the Euphrates .

The Iraqi commander in the area, General Raad Al-Hamdani, is summoned to Baghdad for a meeting with Saddam's son Qusay. He says he was told, "All what happened in the last two weeks was strategic deception and the main enemy action will come from north of Baghdad ." Hamdani protests, saying the Americans are attacking in the south, but he must obey. That evening, however, with the Americans now controlling the bridge over the Euphrates and U.S. tank crews in new positions east of the Euphrates, Hamdani is ordered to turn his units round and counterattack. He musters his most elite troops, a brigade from the Republican Guard's Medina Division, but the battle turns into a slaughter. Not a single American is killed. No one knows how many Iraqi soldiers died.

April 3-4
Troops from the 3rd Infantry reach Saddam International Airport on the western outskirts of Baghdad . On the morning of April 4th, the Iraqis counter-attack and the Americans come face to face with the teenage fanatics of the Baghdad Fedayeen. Most of the Fedayeen are killed.

But the Americans aren't yet ready for the final assault on Baghdad . They still fear what is left of the Republican Guard and wonder where they are. It turns out the key Guard units had been positioned due south of Baghdad ; the American advance had simply bypassed the bulk of them. Before the battle for Baghdad can begin, a brigade is dispatched south to deal with them.

Hidden in dense palm groves to avoid detection from the air, the U.S. forces find the most powerful armored division of the Iraqi army. The U.S. had been bombing the wrong positions. But the American advance to Baghdad has been so fast, the Iraqis are caught by surprise -- with the U.S. forces now coming upon them from the north, most Iraqi tanks are facing the wrong way. In the ferocious battle the follows, the Medina Division simply melts away.

April 5
At dawn, in a surprise armed reconnaissance raid into Baghdad, Col. David Perkins's 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry makes the first "Thunder Run" into the city, driving straight up Highway 8 and taking intense fire.

The Americans encounter morning traffic and many Iraqi defenders are dressed in civilian clothes. American troops are not always successful in distinguishing fighters from civilians. By late morning the Americans have sliced through Baghdad 's south-western suburbs and arrive safely back at the airport.

Meanwhile, in Basra the British slowly are tightening the screw. On an intelligence tip, coalition planes try to assassinate "Chemical Ali." But the F-16 strike misses him and kills 17 civilians. It proves a turning point, however, since many in Basra now believe Chemical Ali is dead.

April 6
The British 7 th Armored Brigade rolls into Basra . At last, the coalition is greeted with celebration by Iraqis. But looting soon begins. The British expected the police, army, and civil administration to be intact and to help run the city. But with the regime gone, everything crumbles. The British haven't planned for this and it is a taste of what is to come.

In Baghdad U.S. Marines now join the American 5th Corps and are given the job of storming the east of the city. Marine commanders anticipate serious resistance, but the Iraqi army is retreating in chaos.

April 7
Approaching Baghdad , U.S. Marines storm the Diyala Bridge near the eastern boundary of the city. Fanning out on the northern bank, they are jittery and fear suicide bombers. Warning shots are fired at vehicles approaching the bridge. If a car doesn't stop, it's riddled with bullets. About a dozen civilians die that morning at the Diyala Bridge .

It takes some time for the Marines to realize that the eastern side of Baghdad is virtually defenseless.

On the west side, a second "Thunder Run" is made by Col. Perkins. He decides to head straight downtown for Saddam's palaces, spreading panic among the Iraqi defenders. Two tank battalions are followed by more 3rd Infantry who are to take and hold three key cloverleafs -- code-named Moe, Larry and Curly -- to secure the road for resupply trucks. Fighting at these interchanges is intense; the fiercest is at Curly.

Colonel Perkins spends the night in Saddam's palace. Nineteen days after crossing the Kuwait border, less than a week after the breakthrough at the Karbala Gap, the Americans have penetrated to the very heart of the regime.

That afternoon the Americans get another intelligence tip on Saddam Hussein: he is in the wealthy Al Mansour district in the west of Baghdad . But the intelligence passed to the Stealth bomber pilots is not precise. The Americans miss again and 18 civilians are killed.

April 8-9
U.S. forces secure Baghdad after final desperate resistance by Fedayeen and Ba'ath Party militias who are fighting almost alone. The regular Iraqi Army soldiers don't fight or even surrender en masse, as the Americans hoped; they simply go home.

Late in the afternoon of April 9, in Baghdad 's Firdos Square , the statue of Saddam Hussein is pulled down.

American columns continue to roll into Baghdad . But there are few of the triumphal scenes Americans had hoped for. The people of Baghdad are wary, suspicious. And as in Basra , looting spreads quickly.

April 11
Mosul falls to Kurdish peshmerga and U.S. Special Operations forces.

Television images of looting and chaos dominate American newscasts in the days following Baghdad 's fall. At a briefing this day, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld reacts bitterly to suggestions the military is not in control of the situation and in a statement dealing with looting, says, "… freedom's untidy and free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things…."

After a few days of inaction, U.S. troops begin cracking down on looters.

April 16
General Tommy Franks, the commander of the invasion, flies into Baghdad to congratulate the American commanders on their swift victory over Saddam Hussein.

But in the weeks that follow, a violent insurgency grows against coalition forces.

May 1
President Bush lands on the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln off the coast of California and announces the official end of combat operations in Iraq .

The insurgency grows in the weeks and months that follow, flowing into the vacuum left by the collapse of authority. In the Sunni Triangle around Baghdad , remnants of the Fedayeen, the Ba'ath Party, foreign Islamic fighters, and even ordinary Iraqis wage a guerrilla war against the occupiers of Iraq .

The losses will mount on all sides. Less than 150 American troops were killed in the allied invasion. As of February 26, 2004 , almost 400 have died in the aftermath.

Endnotes
The CBU-105 Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD) is the CBU-97 Sensor-Fused Weapon (SFW) fitted with a tail kit that increases delivery altitude to 40000’ and standoff range to 12 miles. The SFW itself is cluster munition which combines 10 submunitions with 4 skeet type warheads in a single dispenser, providing 40 weapons total. After release, a fuze causes the dispenser to disperse the 10 submunitions, each stabilized by a parachute. At a preset altitude a rocket fires, propelling the submunition in an upwards vector. As the submunition climbs, it is spun to disperse the 4 internal skeet warheads randomly by centrifugal force. An IR sensor in each warhead searches for a target and upon discovery detonates over it, firing a kinetic fragment. The fragment drives itself through the lightly armoured top of the target. If no target is found, the sensor detonates the warhead above ground to spray the battlefield with a myriad of lethal fragments. This weapon is good against armour and soft skinned targets, covering a 4,800 square yard area.

1 Cordesman, Anthony H. The Instant Lessons of the Iraq War, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003, p35

2 Global Security.Org article on Ops Southern Focus, found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
ops/southern_focus.htm

3 PBS Frontline Chronology of OIF, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/invasion/cron/

4 Though cruise missiles were also used in this case, only a handful of countries possess such technology. On the other hand, almost all countries with advanced air forces are capable of such long-range, precision strikes.

5 Graham and Loeb , Washington Post , Apr 27 2003 , pA01

6 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Air Force Gen. Richard Myers, at a Pentagon news conference on 21 March 2003 , reported on US DoD website http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Mar2003/n03212003_2003032110.html

7 Frederick W. Kagan, in PBS Frontline interview, reported at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/invasion/interviews/kagan.html#shock

8 Graham and Loeb , Washington Post , Apr 27 2003 , pA01

9 Ibid. An Army intelligence officer, presenting these figures to unit commanders, added: "These numbers are somewhat in dispute. They may actually be lower."

10 Ibid.

11 Cordesman Anthony H., The Instant Lessons of the Iraq War, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003, p27

12 Keith Thomas, The Revolution in Military Affairs: Warfare in the Information Age, Canberra : Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1997, p138

13 Bill Sweetman, The Falling Price of Precision, Janes International Defence Review, Apr 2002, p46

14 Mazzetti and Newman, The Seeds of Victory, US News and World Report, April 21 2003, p33

15 Cordesman Anthony H., The Instant Lessons of the Iraq War, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003, p37

16 Robert Heilbroner, The Future as History, New York : Harper & Row, 1960, p193

17Sun Tze, in The Art of War, translated by Lionel Giles, 1910, on http://www.chinapage .com/sunzi-e.htm#01

18 Wing Commander R.J. Keir, Time Sensitive Targeting, Allied Force and its implications for Australia , Australian Defence Force Journal, No 159 March/April 2003, p4.

19 http://www.af.mil/opscenter/swa_ops.asp - US Air Force Link description of Coalition Operations

20 Thomas J Welch, quoting from a Chinese forum on ‘world military revolution’, in The Revolution in Military Affairs: Warfare in the Information Age, Canberra : Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1997, p38

21 General Richard Meyers, in an interview with Defence News, April 14 2003 , p46

22 Sun Tze, in The Art of War, translated by Lionel Giles, 1910, on http://www.chinapage .com/sunzi-e.htm#01

23 USCENTAF, in OIF – By The Numbers, Assessment and Analysis Division, 30 Apr 2003 , p8

24 Terry McCarthy, Whatever Happened to the Republican Guard?, TIME magazine, May 12 2003 , p21

25 Martin Van Creveld, The Art of War, Cassell & Co., London , 2000

26 PBS Frontline Chronology of OIF, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/invasion/cron/