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“People learn most rapidly when they have a genuine sense of responsibility for their actions........ if we know our fate is in our own hands, our learning matters. This is why learning organizations will, increasingly, be ‘localized’ organizations, extending the maximum degree of authority and power, as far from the ‘top’ or corporate center as possible.”
in The Fifth Discipline1
Introduction
Can a large hierarchical organization like the military be a learning organization?
In an article entitled “Leadership, Quality and the US Navy”,2 ex-Naval officer, Robert Masten asserted that the US Navy, as a “large hierarchical, mission-driven military organization could never become a learning organization”. Masten argued that war was the height of competition, about winning and losing, about death and destruction - elements that he felt were not ingredients that made up a learning organization. To perform well in this environment, the Navy instead needed “authoritarian leaders, trained and practised in making life-threatening and life-saving decisions”. The heat of battle was no time for groupthink and instead was a time for clear-cut authority and decisive action. As such, what was required in military leaders was the ability to “solve problems” rather than their ability to “advocate dialogue, empowerment or continuous process improvement.” Masten concluded that it was still necessary for the Navy to breed the “authoritarian leader the nation needs to defeat the enemy”. Reflecting the principles of Weberian bureaucracy, Masten fundamentally believes that in the interest of speed (or efficiency), decisions should be made at the top while the rest (soldiers, sailors or airmen) should merely execute orders in precise military fashion on the battlefield. Good training will ensure that the decisions made by commanders are sufficient reliable and that there was therefore no need for the involvement of other levels in the hierarchy to be involved in decision-making.
I will, in this essay, make the reverse argument. Masten’s basic view perpetuates a widely believed myth held by those outside the military fraternity, that a military organization must be authoritarian to be effective. This assumption is not only highly questionable but is wrong, and is not supported by military history. Learning organizations are organizations that thrive in an environment of high uncertainty and rapid change. Given that the environment in warfighting is precisely subject to uncertainty and change, effective military organizations are therefore quintessential examples of learning organizations. They are not only un-authoritarian, but are highly decentralized, empowering, organismic organizations, embracing the use of initiative by commanders at all levels. These organizations accept “openness” and “localness” as part of the organizational make-up,3 provide a high level of autonomy to commanders throughout the organization, and thrive on a high level of interaction between all members throughout the organization, both vertically and horizontally. This enables all to see the big picture, enabling all (the parts) to work towards the success of the whole, without the need for authoritarian control - the very essence of a learning organization.
Managing Uncertainty
The biggest organizational challenge for the military in war is the quest for certainty.4 Uncertainty is at the heart of war. Clausewitz, the famous philosopher on war, reminds us that the fog of war is real. “A great part of the information that is obtained in war is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is uncertain.”5 Information is moreover subject to interpretation. War brings out the most powerful emotions known to man - including fear, anger, vindictiveness, and hatred. These emotions create conditions in which the quest of certainty cannot proceed rationally. Secondly, war is a contest of wills. With each side free and presumably, willing to double-cross the other to the utmost of their ability, the progress of the struggle is largely unpredictable. Logically, the attainment of certainty is, a priori, impossible.
Van Crevald, in his masterful study of command in war6 argued that command systems in military organizations are basically systems designed to cope with a high degree of uncertainty. In a study of command systems throughout history, militaries have adopted two basic approaches in coping with this uncertainty -centralization or decentralization.
Properly understood, the two ways of coping with uncertainty do not consist of a diminution of uncertainty as opposed to acceptance, but rather a different distribution of uncertainty amongst the various ranks in the hierarchy. Under centralization, the security of the parts is supposed to be assured by the certainty of the whole. However, by restricting the freedom of action of the parts, the risk the parts face increases. Under decentralization, the security of the whole is assured by the certainty of the parts. By allowing greater freedom to the parts, the risks at the higher level are increased. There is hence a trade off.
Van Crevald is in no doubt that military history shows that de-centralized command and control systems are far superior to centralized ones. He concludes that, those armies which have been most successful were those that “did not turn their troops in automatons, did not attempt to control everything from the top, and allowed subordinate commanders considerable latitude.”7
The Learning Military Organization
The German Army in the Second World War, and the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) from 1956 to 1973 have been widely recognized as the most formidable armed forces in the history of warfare and are two outstanding examples of military organizations with fundamentally de-centralized command and control systems.
Both armies placed a high value on offence. Spurred by the invention of the tank, the German Army in WWII invented and operationalized the war fighting doctrine of blitzkrieg or lightning war. Instead of fighting in well-ordered lines that was characteristic of earlier wars on the continent, German doctrine emphasized speed, movement and dislocation, through the penetration of enemy lines at key points with heavy armoured formations. Once behind enemy lines, instead of stopping, forces would continue to advance deep in the rear, disrupting supply chains, artillery positions, communication networks, and command facilities, and avoid fighting the strength of the enemy at the front. Attacking the rear would deny the front of these essential support elements, and lead to such confusion that this would lead to a rapid collapse of the front. The key idea was to deny the enemy the luxury of fighting orderly sequential battles.8 In a series of wars from 1956 onwards, the IDF built on this German doctrine and perfected it to become the masters of mobile warfare.
This doctrine of fighting stressed the traditional command and control systems in two areas. Given the emphasis on manoeuverability, the command system had to cope with a much higher level of complexity, fluidity and uncertainty. Secondly, since the doctrine sought to dislocate the enemy, it had to foster greater responsiveness within the system. In military speak, it would have to have a faster observe-orient-decision-action (OODA)9 cycle or loop than the enemy so that it could out-think and out-manoeuver the enemy at every turn. Making quicker decisions in a more uncertain environment was the key command challenge.
The only command system that was workable in such an environment was one that allowed a large measure of independence to all levels.10 Given that the best battle
plans do not survive beyond the crossing of the start line, a high premium is placed on allowing the maximum use of initiative by junior commanders to react to (adaptive learning) and develop (generative learning) the highly fluid situation before them, constrained only by the higher command’s strategic intent and broad guidelines. This command and control philosophy was called by the German’s auftragstatik, which translated roughly means “mission oriented tactics”. Subordinate commanders are not given detailed orders but given clear objectives. They are allowed considerable autonomy and leeway in deciding how they achieve these objectives. Autonomy also extends to the fact that junior commanders can even change the objectives assigned to them if the situation has developed such that the mission has become irrelevant.11 (Generative learning resulting in innovation.) This degree of freedom makes the entire organization “organismic” - countless local decision-making processes that continually respond to changes.12
To more properly illustrate this system (which operates even in peacetime), it is worth quoting General Mordechai Gur of the IDF:13
“A proper command system should be able to set itself goals and then strive to attain those goals in spite of the clear realization that things will go wrong, but also in the confidence that, when they do go wrong, the system will be able to overcome the obstacles. Such a system might operate in two different ways. The first is to plan everything in detail and then start going. The second is to lay down general objectives only and to start going at once. The system then gains momentum, and the details arefilled in even as progress is being made. The IDF normally takes the second of theseways. It is like a smart bomb being released on the basis of general data, without the target even being seen. Later, after a few miles, the bomb identifies the target and is locked on it. From this point, it flies accurately until the objective is reached....
Can an Army be constructed in this way without missing too many of its objectives? The answer is that doctrine, research and development, and organization cannot be built on the basis of detailed plans. Guidelines must be laid down and the system put into gear. However this is only possible when the bureaucratic machine is reasonably lean and fast in operation, and on condition that the information passed by it is correct and accurate. Without fast and accurate feedback, it would have been impossible for the IDF to exist, much less to respond to changing times.
A proper command system, then, consists of a combination of thorough, even pedestrian, preparation with freedom that is granted to imagination and individual daring. Its operation is based on three principles, namely a) a clear definition of the objectives to be attained; b) thorough planning; and c) a proper order of priorities. The third condition implies the recognition that, whatever one’s priorities are, some things are going to suffer neglect. One’s list of priorities should be subject to constant reexamination. The danger of adhering to a single idea, and even worse to a predetermined plan, must be avoided. Discipline and teamwork must be combined with improvisation. Controls, both external and internal, must be in continuous operation.
All three conditions must appear self-contradicting; but in reality, it is the balance between them that determines the IDF’s unique character.......
Innovation during execution itself; discipline; and improvisation - these are the three basic elements that make up the IDF’s command system, even if the latter two sometimes contradict each other.”14
Operational control in such a decentralized system is achieved through the issuance of guidelines, not through an adherence to a series of orders from top down. In the IDF, the system of “optional control” ensures maximum independence to subordinate commanders to react to changing situations. Superior headquarters interferes only when major changes in plans have an impact on other units.
Effort is kept aligned through a thorough explanation of the commander’s intent, and kept in check by extensive communications allowing the passage of “correct and accurate” information, “fast and accurate” feedback.
The alignment of effort is vitally important so that the operation does not degenerate into chaos. This is a necessary condition that must be achieved before individuals are empowered.15 This is achieved by having commanders attain a deep understanding of the strategic intent of the superior commander (shared vision). Subordinate commanders are trained to understand not only their superior commander’s intent, but also their commander’s com-mander’s intent - i.e. two levels up. This helps them focus on the big picture. Considerable effort is therefore placed in explaining the concept of the operation - the “why” in the mission statement.16 In so doing, individual unit commanders are expected to identify with the objectives of the greater whole. Unlike autonomous units that compete with each other in many corporate organizations, each subordinate unit in the IDF actively cooperates with one another to achieve the overall goal of winning the war.
The alignment is kept in check by a high degree of openness in communications, built around a system that allows for the transmission of information “from top down, from bottom up, and laterally among the subordinate units”.17 This is indispensable in keeping all units on the same page and working in concert. In operations, IDF units operated on common radio nets, and communicated extensively. It was not unusual for IDF commanders to listen in to subordinates communicate with one another and to meet them personally at the front.18 But it is also the quality of the communications that matters. The aim is to have “conversations” or “dialogues”, of the quality that Senge advocates. This provides the common basis for future action.19 Dialogue (a free flow of meaning between two people) underlines team learning and allows the military to engage in collective sense making in a very confusing environment. This was the very skill that was dismissed by Masten as being irrelevant in the military. The conditions that allow for this “openness” are the ones that are emphasized in the IDF - good leadership, a common “language” that allows for under-standing during tense periods, and an especially high degree of operational trust, “where each team member remains conscious of other team members, and can be counted on to act in ways that complement each others’ action”,20 something that develops from having spent extensive time training together, and of deeply holding to the cause. It is only through this “openness” that a military organization is capable of adaptive and generative learning. Priorities are subject to “constant reexamination”.
These key features that make up the command system of the IDF appear to be high decentralization and autonomy, distributed leadership throughout the organization, the ability of parts to work towards the good of the whole, and the interactiveness that leads to a wide sharing of information and consensus in taking action. These are essential elements of a learning organization. The parallels with organizations in the business world are easy to see. It is possible that traditional centralized “command systems” in corporations are likewise ill suited to succeed in an environment of high uncertainty and rapid change and can only operate if they incorporate the elements of the learning organization that can be found in the IDF. It is only through this that adaptive and generative learning can take place.
As always, the IDF system is not perfect. In fact, the basic assumption of a learning organization is that there will be a certain amount of confusion and waste given the wide leeway afforded subordinates. In the IDF, this is accepted as a necessary evil. In fact, such confusion is not inconsistent with, but may be a prerequisite for results.21 Van Crevald notes that in the 1957 campaign, a highly successful campaign for the IDF, the wide latitude afforded the IDF commanders resulted in some brigades being successful, others less so, yet others too much so. Efficiency and neatness are not the hallmarks of a learning organization. On one occasion, an entire brigade stood by with folded arms, while two others were fighting.22
Conclusion
The IDF from 1956-1973 provides a good example of a large hierarchical military organization as a learning organization. Context matters. Hierarchy need not stop the development of a learning organization. Organizations are complex systems comprising of interacting sub-systems - organizational design, culture and politics.23 Features within the organization, such as the command and control system and, especially, the cultural and value system that underlines the organization, can make a difference as to how hierarchy affects behaviour throughout the organization.
It is for this reason that replicating the Israeli system is not easy. In the IDF’s case, being in a state of war helps. The loose form of command and control is also supported by history and the cultural values within Israeli society. While many Western militaries have traditionally upheld authoritarianism within the military, the IDF had a fundamentally different starting point. The forerunner of the IDF was the Hagana - an underground, semi-partisan, regular formation, largely non-authoritarian and loosely stratified24 where members took pride in their slovenly outlook. To an observer therefore, the IDF is a defence force of contradiction. It is a military force of considerable strength, but is extremely casual in behaviour. The concept of discipline in the Israeli Army is limited to the need for obedience in executing orders in war, but disposing with all other symbols of submission reflecting their roots as a partisan army.
Israeli culture also promotes a “loose” attitude towards authority. Israel society is singularly devoid of any disciplinarian climate - the lack of repressive control and prohibitiveness is particularly in evidence in Israeli schools and homes. The average Israeli soldier, while accepting the need for obedience to orders, is an unquenchable arguer, not willing to let anything pass without commenting on it. Israeli military culture therefore does not seek to eliminate rank and authority, but seeks to maximize participation in implementing decisions at all levels. “Command” gives way to “leadership” where a commander is a team leader, who is taught to temper his command with explanation so that there is “enrollment” in the plan. The image of a professional officer is not that of a disciplinarian but a teacher (or coach) in the art of war.25 Soldiers are equivalently viewed as interested pupils eager to learn. These social dynamics supports learning in a fashion that is unattainable in many other traditional militaries.
Endnotes
1 Senge, Peter, The Fifth Discipline, Doubleday, New York, 1990, pg 287.
2 See Masten R L, “Leadership, Quality and the US Navy” in Chawla S, and Renesch J (ed), Learning Organizations, Productivity Press, Portland, 1994.
3 See Senge, Chap 13, 14.
4 Van Crevald, Martin, Command in War, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1985, pg 264
5 Clausewitz C von, On War, Vol 1, London, 1962, pg 75
6 Ibid
7 Ibid pg 270.
8 A good short description of the key ideas of maneuver warfare is captured in Lind, William, Maneuver Warfare Handbook Westview Press, 1985. A longer treatise is offered by Leonhard Robert, The Art of Maneuver, Presideo, Novato, 1991.
9 Lind, William, op cit
10 Ibid, pg 202.
11 Ibid, op cit
12 Senge, Peter pg 293.
13 Gur, M, “The IDF - Continuity vs Innovation”, (Hebrew), Maarachot, March 1978, pg 4-6.
14 Another common argument for a decentralized command and control system is that it is less vulnerable to enemy action. In a highly centralized system where the top only makes the decision, the military machine grinds to a halt once key command nodes are neutralized. In contrast, a system where leadership is distributed throughout the organization, the system can continue to function in spite of the loss of some command nodes. What essentially led to the rapid collapse of Saddam’s Army in the Gulf War in 1991 was the fact that the Iraqi’s Army’s command and control system was centralized in Saddam’s hands. Once the communication nodes were neutralized, the entire Iraqi Army remained effectively static because they were left awaiting orders that would not come. See Friedman, Norman, Desert Victory, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1991 Chap 13.
15 Senge, Peter Chap 12
16 See Lind William, op cit
17 Van Crevald, pg 271.
18 Van Crevald gives a good description of this by observing the habits of Gen Gavish in the 6 Day War. See pg 199-200.
19 Senge, Peter Chap 12
20 Senge, Peter pg 236.
21 Ibid, pg 271.
22 Ibid pg 198.
23 See Ancona D, Kochan T, Scully M, Van Mannen J, Westney D E, Managing for the Future: Organizational Behavior and Processes (2nd edition), Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western Publishing, 1999.
24 Rolbant Samuel, The Israeli Soldier, South Brunswick, New York, 1970, pg 192-204.
25 Ibid pg 198.
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