MINDEF - News - Speech by Minister for Defence Teo Chee Hean at Committee of Supply Debate 2006 (06 Mar 06)

Contact Info \| Feedback \| Sitemap
	Search
Advanced Search

Home

About Us

MINDEF/SAF Websites

Publications

News & Events

Careers

Resources

Useful Links

	News & Events
	News Releases
	2008
	2007
	2006
	2005
	2004
	2003
	2002
	2001
	2000
	1999
	1998
	1997
	1996
	Events

Home > News & Events > News Releases > 2006 > March > Speech by Minister for Defence Teo Chee Hean at Committee of Supply Debate 2006

Speech by Minister for Defence Teo Chee Hean at Committee of Supply Debate 2006

Email Article

Print Article

Media Contacts

Posted: 06 Mar 2006, 2020 hours (Time is GMT +8 hours)



Minister for Defence Teo Chee Hean

Integrated Strike

Mr Chairman, Sir, I would first like to thank the Honourable Members for their comments and questions, and for their support and robust commitment to defence.

Trends in our Security Environment

Mr Ravindran, Mr Hawazi Daipi and Mr Steve Chia have asked for an assessment of our regional security environment. Sir, the geopolitical landscape of the Asia-Pacific region is in a state of flux. The shifts which are now taking place will lead to significant changes in the geostrategic balance. The US remains pre-eminent, with its superior military power, economic strength and political influence. But alongside this is a new reality - China and India, the two Asian giants, are now on the rise. This is reshaping the strategic contours of our region. What is less clear is what shape our region - and indeed the world - will take in the future. The situation will be made more complex by the greater assertiveness of Japan, and perhaps also a resurgent Russia, in the coming years.

China and India have both abandoned autarky and are seeking economic linkages with the world. They are now both major trading and energy importing nations, and their search for foreign sources of raw materials and markets, as well as their dependence on them, can only grow. As a consequence, both China and India now have an interest in the security of sea routes, and of their energy sources.

Southeast Asia is situated at the confluence of major sea routes, and at the crossroads between India and China. The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are now vital lifelines for these two emerging powers, as they are for the US, Japan and the countries in our region. Our region is also a major source of oil and gas. So we can expect that the issues of maritime security and energy security will loom larger in our region and become more critical for the major powers. Singapore, therefore, must have the wherewithal - military and diplomatic - to play a role to contribute to regional security and stability and also to protect our national interests and ensure our security as the geopolitical landscape evolves.

Singapore and the SAF have therefore been playing active roles in multilateral efforts to enhance maritime security. Over the past year, we contributed to developing a consensus among the three littoral states of the Straits of Malacca that while we, the littoral states, have the primary responsibility for the security of the Straits, major user states and other stakeholders have a role to play as well. Also, whatever measures are undertaken to enhance security must be in accordance with international law and respect the sovereignty of the littoral states. Dr Ong asked about the measures to safeguard the Malacca Straits. In the last two years, the littoral states have jointly launched air and sea patrols to demonstrate our commitment to safeguard this strategic waterway. We are also working with the international community, through, for example, the IMO and member states to focus on maritime security in straits such as the Malacca Straits.

Another major threat to our security is - as Mr Hawazi has noted - that of trans-national terrorism. The list of countries hit by terrorist attacks continues to grow. The danger is by no means over. In fact, with the terrorists exploiting modern technology to their advantage and organising themselves better to evade detection, the fight will be long and arduous one. This is a fight that may take many generations, for it is an ideological war that they are waging. The fact that Azahari Hussain was killed in Indonesia does not change that. Personalities might change, organisations might evolve but the ideology and the objectives remain the same and there are others who are still at large. Bomb makers like Noordin Top and their disciples, those who have learnt from them, these dark arts, they are still at large. So we still have to remain on our guard.

Back to top

Our Defence Policy - Deterrence and Defence Diplomacy

Sir, Dr Ong Chit Chung has asked if new security threats have brought any changes to our defence policy. And Mr Ravindran asked about the state of our defence relations and defence diplomacy. Sir, the fundamentals of Singapore's defence policy are determined by our geography and environment. We are a small island with no strategic depth. We have no hinterland to absorb an attack, and there is no natural buffer between the external environment and our populated areas and economic infrastructure. We are also a maritime nation, critically dependent on the security of sea lines of communications and the freedom of navigation. Our geography - both in the contours and size of our island and in our location in a sometimes turbulent region - is immutable.

Given these realities and the uncertainties of the regional environment, we continue to pursue deterrence and diplomacy as the twin pillars of our defence policy. We have invested considerable resources into building up a defence force that can deter aggression. And should deterrence fail, the Singapore Armed Forces must be able to defeat the aggressor swiftly and decisively.

At the same time, we have also been enhancing our security by pursuing active defence diplomacy. The objectives of our defence diplomacy are to develop positive and mutually beneficial relationships with friendly countries and armed forces, to contribute to a stable and cooperative regional environment and international order.

On the bilateral level, good defence relations also enable us to overcome our land and air space constraints. Today, the SAF trains in about a dozen countries around the world. We are very grateful to our friends for extending this assistance to us. These overseas training facilities, along with the exercises that the SAF conducts with foreign armed forces, bring significant benefits in terms of enhancing the SAF's professional skills, improving inter-operability with friendly forces, and offering opportunities to benchmark ourselves. Our defence diplomacy also affords us valuable technology cooperation.

The Strategic Framework Agreement we signed with the United States last year provides the framework for Singapore and the US to expand the scope of defence cooperation and work together to enhance regional stability and peace.

We are also nurturing newer defence relationships. Having signed the Defence Cooperation Agreement with India in 2003, we have since been expanding interactions with the Indian Armed Forces. The regular naval exercises over the past decade have now been augmented by air and land exercises for the last two years. With China, my visit last November at the invitation of my Chinese counterpart provided a useful opportunity for developing a better understanding of each other's perspectives on security issues of mutual concern, and it was agreed that we would step up defence interactions.

Bilateral defence cooperation with our ASEAN partners, Thailand and Brunei, continues to be substantive and strong, and from which both sides benefit. We look forward to strengthening the mutually beneficial defence cooperation with Indonesia when the Defence Cooperation Agreement is concluded. This will stand as a strong symbol of cooperation between two close neighbours.

Singapore also continues to play an active role in regional groupings which enhance security, such as ASEAN, the Five Power Defence Arrangements, the ASEAN Regional Forum and, more recently, the East Asia Summit. We support the creation of the ASEAN security community and we work together with our ASEAN neighbours to realise it. As Asia opens up, multilateral engagements will become even more important for confidence-building and facilitating dialogue - not just among regional parties but also to engage countries beyond the region which have a stake in the stability and prosperity of Asia. Open platforms, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, will become increasingly important now that greater cooperation is required to deal with trans-national security issues like terrorism, counter-proliferation and maritime security. The Shangri-la Dialogue, held annually in Singapore since 2002 and to be held again in the middle of the year, brings together defence ministers and strategic thinkers from around the region and beyond to discuss the global issues and create better understanding and hopefully better consensus as to what can be done.

Singapore has also been an active participant in such multilateral efforts as the Proliferation Security Initiative (or PSI) and we work closely with other countries in the fight against terrorism. The SAF organised the first PSI exercise in Southeast Asia last August, which involved 13 participating countries, sending ships, planes and observers. The RSN organised the first sea exercise and other professional exchanges on maritime security issues involving 19 navies of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium. Last year also, the Army hosted a Special Forces conference involving 19 Asia-Pacific countries to enhance regional cooperation in counter-terrorism.

Sir, the SAF has also continued to participate in humanitarian relief and peace support operations. We have deployed KC-135 tankers, C-130 transport aircraft and LSTs to support the reconstruction of Iraq. Right now, one of our LSTs is currently in the Northern Arabian Gulf. She is on patrol, I just read the report before coming here, protecting the largest Iraqi oil terminal. Closer to home, SAF monitors are working alongside their ASEAN and EU counterparts in support of the Aceh peace process.

The SAF has also kept up a high operational tempo with various relief missions. After assisting in post-tsunami relief in Aceh and Phuket at the beginning of last year, the SAF deployed again for relief efforts in Nias in March, and when Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans in August. Last October, an SAF medical team was sent to Bali after the terrorist attack, and two C-130s delivered aid to Pakistan after the earthquake.

In all these missions, the SAF demonstrated its operational readiness and professionalism. Their swift response and effectiveness in executing these missions were the result of years of steady investment in our people and equipment, and in building up a robust system capable of rapid and flexible responses.

Back to top

Defence Expenditure

Sir, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance missions are roles the SAF undertakes to enhance Singapore's national interests and contribute our part as a responsible international citizen. But the SAF's core mission remains the defence of Singapore's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and our vital interests.

Both Professor Ivan Png and Mr Steve Chia have pointed out that the defence budget takes up a significant proportion of national expenditure. That is so because the Government considers it vital that we have a defence capability which can effectively deter potential adversaries. The Government's strong commitment to ensuring Singapore's security, the calibre of our defence force, and the determination of Singaporeans to protect what is theirs, is the key to our security and survival as an independent country.

A strong defence allows us to pursue the best interests of our country and our people, and to chart our own course steadily and confidently. It is, unfortunately, the lot of small nations to come under external pressure - as we have from time to time. We would not want to have to succumb to such pressure. When there are loud voices raised against us, we must be able to take them in our stride and remain quietly confident. The SAF gives us the political space to chart our own destiny.

Professor Png has asked why our percentage of GDP expenditure on defence is higher than most other countries in Asia. As I had pointed out last year in response to a similar question, numerical comparisons of defence expenditures are not particularly meaningful. For instance, to say that Vietnam spent almost 7% of GDP on defence while Japan allocated 1% tells us, really very little, almost nothing of the relative defence capabilities of these two countries. And most importantly, no two countries have exactly the same strategic circumstances. There is geography and history to consider, the surrounding environment to look at. Finland, Sweden and Switzerland believe that they should reap the peace dividend after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The situation in Europe today is very different from when it was in the 70s or 80s. At the end of the day, each country has to forge its own path, taking into account its security environment and the unique combination of resources and attributes that geography, demography and history have conferred on it.

I should also point out that military expenditures in Asia have been rising steadily. According to the US Congressional Research Service, Asia is now the largest arms market in the developing world. From 2001 to 2004, five of the top ten buyers were from Asia, namely China, India, South Korea, Malaysia and Pakistan. Since 2000, some countries have doubled their military spending to modernise their armed forces. Western European and Russian defence companies are finding that the Asia-Pacific is a significant market, not just in terms of quantity, purchasing power but also for increasingly sophisticated hardware.

Professor Png has made the point that there is no need to spend more money simply because the economy is growing. And indeed, MINDEF does not take a feast and famine approach. We do not suddenly ramp up spending just because we have a good year. Nor do we squeeze it down sharply when the economy turns down. Our policy has been to put in consistent investments, both in good times and lean years.

It would be too late to start buying weapons and to raise and train forces only when an obvious threat confronts us. Building an effective defence force takes many years and cannot be done in fits and starts. It takes more than a decade to bring a major new capability into service - from conception to bringing the system into operation with fully trained servicemen and supporting infrastructure. MINDEF draws up long-term multi-year plans so that the SAF is built up as a coherent and integrated force. There are checks and balances in the system to make sure that the money is well spent.

Sir, the development of our defence capabilities cannot be directed only at what appears to be the most imminent threat. We should not lose sight of the fundamentals of our geostrategic circumstances just because terrorism is the most obvious threat today. We must remember that our most critical need is really to have a defence force which can deter threats to our sovereignty, enable us to withstand external pressure, and prevail over the aggressor should there be a conflict.

I wish to assure Dr Ong, Mr Hawazi and Professor Png that at the same time the SAF has also been strengthening its capabilities for homeland security, and will continue to do so, working closely with the Home Team to deal with terrorist threats. Among these capabilities, let me just mention two. One is the Island Defence Headquarters and the second, our Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Explosives units. It is important to know that these two, both the IDHQ, Island Defence HQ and the CBRE units are not new creations. We did not create them just after 9 - 11 2001. Both have been in existence or development for some two decades. The possibility of low-intensity, unconventional attack was one which we never dismiss and hence which we prepared for.

So we made contingencies to deal with them. When the threat of catastrophic terrorism reared its ugly head in 2001, we were able to build on the existing Island Defence Headquarters, augment it with certain capabilities and stand it up quickly as a 24/7 Headquarters. We had started building up our Chemical Biological Radiological Explosives capability in the late 1980s - almost 20 years ago. This included seeking the expertise of some of Professor Png's colleagues in NUS so that we painstakingly built up a complete capability with operational units suited to operate in our climatic conditions, backed up by laboratories and experts, and based on a solid scientific foundation. This goes to show how important it is to take a long-term view when it comes to developing our defence capabilities; we cannot afford to wait until a threat is upon us. If we have not built up the IDHQ and CBRE units over a long time span, when Sept 11 2001 struck us, we would have been scrambling around, trying to get things in place and I am not even sure that today, just four or five years later, that we would be safe and satisfied with what we have, with just that three or four years.

Sir, MINDEF is fully conscious of our responsibility to use the money allocated to defence prudently and stringently. MINDEF has rigorous checks in our budget process. Acquisition programmes are carefully scrutinised at various levels to determine need, evaluate options, and decide on the most cost-effective solutions.

The rigour and integrity of our system is widely acknowledged by defence analysts. Singapore has acquired a hard-earned reputation as a reference customer. This was why our decision on the RSAF's Fighter Programme was watched so closely around the world. Let me quote a recent observation in the 21 February 2006 issue of Flight Daily News, which says: "Singapore's evaluation was widely praised as being thorough, in-depth and comprehensive." In fact, a number of countries who are considering fighter purchases have come to our procurement agencies to ask us the processes by which we went through our evaluation. Another article, in the 23 February issue of Aviation Week, noted that for the contenders in the current competition to supply the RSAF a trainer aircraft, "a win . . . will be valuable not only in financial terms. Singapore's preference may well go on to influence other prospective customers worldwide." We could not have gained such a reputation if MINDEF did not have the highest standards of prudence and stringency in our expenditure.

Sir, history has no lack of examples of nations which have fallen to aggressors because they were not prepared. Or not prepared to be prepared. We all know what happened to Kuwait in 1991. Singapore has no buffer. If deterrence should fail and the SAF is called into battle, it cannot afford to fail in its mission. We will not have a second chance. This is what we mean when we say that our defence spending is our insurance policy. We have to maintain a strong defence now so that we will not have to pay a much higher price in the future. At another level, as the Minister for Defence, as I am sure, this is true for all Singaporeans, we should make sure that if our soldiers, sailors and airmen ever have to go into battle, they have the best equipment and training that we can provide them.

Back to top

Transformation and the 3G SAF

Sir, Mr Ravindran, Mr Leong Horn Kee, Dr Teo, Mr Sin Boon Ann have asked about the progress of the SAF's transformation efforts. I would like to report that we are well on the way to developing the capabilities of the 3rd Generation SAF. The SAF has been experimenting with new operational concepts, capabilities, technologies and training methods.

As I pointed out last year, transformation is a journey and not a static goal. This ensures that the SAF is always ready to face new challenges and can fight and win the wars of tomorrow, not get stuck in the fighting concepts of past wars. As one set of capabilities is delivered, there will be a spiral development to deliver the next set of capabilities. These are the demands of the modern battlefield as armed forces leverage on technology to enhance their edge over potential adversaries. We are fortunate that MINDEF and the SAF have the science and engineering resources in our Defence organisations and industries; and that more than 80% of each cohort coming into National Service are tech-savvy soldiers with A-level, Polytechnic, or ITE qualifications. And our National Servicemen in our reserve forces also are very well qualified and have no difficulty converting to this new equipment and concepts.

Mr Leong Horn Kee and Mr Ravindran asked about the impact of the reduction in full-time NS to 2 years, for those who previously had to serve 2½ years. As Members are aware, the transformation of the SAF was the key driver that made this feasible. The 2-year NS system has been implemented smoothly since December 2004. Incidentally, the drive to 3G SAF also allowed us to reduce the ICT call-ups for our NSmen from 13 years to 10 years. So it is not just the fulltime NSmen but also the NSmen who have benefited from this, the operationally ready NSmen. The training of our commanders and for our units has been adjusted to factor in the shorter deployment period of our national servicemen. Our transformation efforts also mean that more of our national servicemen will be deployed in positions which are more challenging and make better use of their education and training in utilising the capabilities of the 3G SAF.

Sir, I have sought the Chairman's indulgence and the Speaker's indulgence, So allow me now to share with Members a video which illustrates one of the key capabilities of the 3G SAF. This shows the integrated sensor-shooter network which was exercised in two major exercises the SAF conducted last November - Forging Sabre in the Mojave Desert in California, and Wallaby in Shoalwater Bay in Queensland. In these exercises, the SAF linked a series of sensors - manned and unmanned, airborne and ground - to form a tight network to watch over the battlefield. As you can see, once a sensor detects a target, the information is sent to the HQ in real time. A UAV can track the enemy and relay a continuous stream of target information to the HQ and a network of shooters. The most appropriate shooter is quickly assigned to take out the target. Or a suite of shooters can launch a synchronised attack. Fighter aircraft can come in quickly with precision bombs. The Apache attack helicopters, which can detect more than 200 targets with their Longbow radar, can take out many tanks rapidly with Hellfire missiles, rockets and guns. The artillery guns will wipe out what remains of the enemy. Multiple sensors can confirm the effects on the enemy forces and the HQ can quickly decide what follow-on strikes are necessary. With information technology and networking, the SAF has brought the sensor-to-shooter cycle down to a matter of minutes. I will show it to you again so that you can have another look.

As you can see, we can find the target by multiple means and we can attack it by multiple means as well. This makes it difficult for the enemy to hide or to run. It also makes it difficult for him to counter-attack effectively as there is no single point of vulnerability that he can hit and cripple our systems. In conventional warfare, the commanders are also faced with a dilemma, a trade-off between dispersion and concentration of forces is a key challenge. Networking allows us to disperse our forces so that we are less vulnerable, and yet able to bring together a concentration of fire, concentration of force and effects, to deliver a massive blow to the enemy.

You can see that the strength of the 3G SAF is not from superior platform numbers or specific platform capabilities alone. Rather, the strength of the 3G SAF will be multiplied by the ability to network our various systems and capabilities together to achieve a quantum leap in total capability. For example, the way to combat tanks is no longer by fielding more and bigger tanks. These are necessary but this is not the only way to solve the problem. Our anti-tank capability will comprise a network of unmanned sensors, precision missiles delivered by Apache attack helicopters, smart bombs delivered by fighter aircraft, and armoured forces on the ground. The whole, as the saying goes, will be greater than the sum of the parts. I have distributed a DVD and some MINDEF and SAF publications showing Exercise Forging Sabre and Exercise Wallaby to give Members a clearer concept of networked warfare.

Mr Sin Boon Ann asked what the SAF has learned from the US experience in Iraq. First, let me say that the SAF is constantly learning from many other armed forces and not just the Americans. In doing so, we do not merely copy, but apply what we learn to our own circumstances. Technologies will not solve all the problems in the urban environment, or for that matter any environment. But we will equip our soldiers with technologies that can make a significant difference to their fight in the urban environment.

I have here with me an example of such technologies. It is meant to be dropped and thrown, so it is all right. This surveillance ball was developed by ST Engineering for fighting in built-up areas (or FIBUA). It has embedded sensors, and our soldiers can roll it round a corner or throw it into a room so they can see behind walls. This will improve situational awareness and minimise casualties. 3SIR, our urban operations battalion, is now conducting trials with this FIBUA surveillance ball. The SAF will be fielding more of such technologies to help our soldiers overcome the many complexities of the battlefield.

As the SAF continues its transformation journey, it will continue to maintain a high state of operational readiness. The operational readiness of the SAF may not make headlines everyday. But the SAF is constantly at work quietly behind the scenes - whether conducting regular naval and air patrols in the Malacca Straits, securing major international events like the International Olympic Council meeting, or escorting high value ships through our sealanes.

Back to top

Training Safety

Sir, the operational readiness of the SAF requires sustained hard work and rigorous training. The training has to be rigorous, as pointed out by Mr Ravindran, and it has to be realistic. We have to prepare our servicemen well, because military operations are very demanding and victory or defeat hangs in the balance. We also owe it to our servicemen that we prepare them adequately so that they have the ability and confidence to fight, survive and win should they ever have to go into battle.

Training has to be tough and realistic but it also has to be in strict accordance with safety regulations and safety procedures. There is top-level focus on safety in the SAF. Mr Tan Soo Koon has point out. And we do expect the highest safety standards from our commanders. Safety requirements are systematically integrated into all SAF activities, and safety systems and processes are continually being improved.

The SAF has also strengthened its safety inspectorates and, in addition to safety officers, formations have been augmented with Formation Safety Warrant Officers who have extensive experience and knowledge of safety and risk management. There are regular safety audits of the units, including surprise audits. The previous workyear, the last workyear, there were about 1000 such audits so that works out to about 20 such audits in various units. High-risk activities are audited more frequently. The results of the audits are reported to the respective Service Chiefs.

Whenever there is an incident, whether or not it involves injury, the safety inspectorate of the particular Service will review what happened and draw lessons, and these lessons are then disseminated to all personnel. The SAF also reviews near-misses as valuable lessons can be drawn from them. We want to develop an open culture where people are encouraged to report near misses and share the lessons. And this requires a change in mindset. We are working on that. The SAF is also drawing lessons from the safety practices of other established armed forces like the UK, US and Australia. Ms Irene Ng asked about comparisons with other armed forces. Yes we do benchmark. We compare the systems and the procedures that we have in place against those in other armed forces and we are comparable, if not better than the best practises. We are not able to compare data because of the basis of collecting the data, numerators and denominators are different and there is no standardised basis for this. Except for the air force. The air forces use the number of incidents or accidents, per 100 000 hours as the norm for which they compare against each other. On that comparative basis, our air force does as well as, if not better than the air forces of advanced developed countries. So our safety systems are there and in place.

There are two dimensions to safety, both equally important - the system and the individual. We must have rigorous safety systems and processes and there must be strong command emphasis and command responsibility. Our servicemen must also have a high level of safety consciousness and alertness, so that the entire safety chain remains strong and unbroken. We will do our best, but even with the best efforts, it is not possible to entirely eliminate training incidents. However we must ensure a rigorous system, minimise human errors, and learn from the mistakes and not repeat them. And reduce to absolute minimum and eliminate them if possible, such accidents.

Sir, Mr Tan Soo Khoon and Dr Ong Chit Chung asked about the training deaths last year. There were 4 training incidents that resulted in fatalities in 2005. In the first incident in June 2005, a regular serviceman in training for the Special Operations Force drowned during maritime counter-terrorist training. This is very demanding training to carry out the extremely difficult mission of approaching a ship which may be in the open sea, and then taking it over, by force if necessary, with minimum casualties to any hostages. Only specially selected regular troopers who volunteer for this Force undergo such training. And they are rigorously prepared in step by step, progressive training, in order to be able to conduct such missions. It is a very very demanding mission. These are things which ordinary human beings don't do. These are very special men and I certainly am deeply grateful and the nation should be deeply grateful that there are men, Singaporeans who are prepared to volunteer for such missions and to put their lives on the line at anytime, 24 hours a day when they are called upon to undertake a rescue mission. The Attorney General's Chambers, after reviewing the facts of the case, the investigation reports by the Police, and the findings of the Coroner's Court, found no legal grounds for proceeding with criminal charges against the four servicemen who were conducting the training. AGC has now referred the matter to MINDEF for possible action under military law. MINDEF will conduct further investigations before we decide on the next course of action. If our investigations show that any of the 4 servicemen has failed to perform his duties as required, we will take the appropriate disciplinary proceedings against the serviceman under military law.

The second incident in July 2005 involved two servicemen - an SAF serviceman and a foreign serviceman. They were doing helicopter rappelling training when they fell after their ropes disengaged from the rope attachment device on the helicopter. The Police investigation is still in progress. This training has since resumed after a thorough review has been done and improvements were made to the rope attachment device and dispatch procedures.

The other two cases were of two servicemen who collapsed while taking part in runs and subsequently died. The autopsies revealed that these were cases of Sudden Cardiac Death. Our investigations showed that the medical responses in both cases were appropriate and adequate. The SAF has a regime for screening for cardiac risk factors, starting before a serviceman is enlisted. But it is not always possible to detect a heart ailment before a person suffers a heart attack. Over the last five years, there were 6 cases of Sudden Cardiac Death in the SAF that occurred during training.

Sir, the SAF will continue to strengthen its safety systems and procedures, as well as its safety culture. Even as we proceed with tough and realistic training - as we must, to enhance the SAF’s capabilities and operational readiness - MINDEF will continue to make sure that we do so without compromising safety.

On Ms Irene Ng's suggestion to erect a memorial to commemorate servicemen who lost their lives in the line of duty, MINDEF recognises that the servicemen who lose their lives have made the ultimate sacrifice while serving the country. We will consider her suggestion. During the SAF Day Parade on 1st July each year, a minute's silence is observed to pay tribute to the servicemen who lost their lives in the course of duty. This is a deeply significant segment of the annual parade. MINDEF believes that this is a meaningful and solemn recognition of SAF servicemen who lost their lives during training.

Sir, technology is critical for the 3G SAF. But the human spirit in any fight is perhaps even more critical. Our soldiers must be well-trained and disciplined, and they must have in them the fighting spirit to overcome adversity and defeat the enemy regardless of the conditions, regardless of the odds. I fully agree with the observation that ultimately it is the people who make the difference - people who are well trained and who have the determination to fight and win.

Singaporeans should be grateful for the commitment and sacrifices of our National Servicemen. They form the backbone of our defence. Our nation is fortunate that Singaporeans understand the need for National Service, and that our NSmen are committed to their duty to the nation and their families give them their support as they do so. It is only right that we show our appreciation for the efforts and contributions of our NSmen.

I am therefore pleased to inform Members that after careful study of RECORD IV's recommendations, MINDEF has accepted all the recommendations. The recommendations are comprehensive, benefiting all NSmen and recognising their contributions, with a good mix of broad-based initiatives, such as the 40th Anniversary NS Bonus, and targeted initiatives, such as the proposals to recognise our key command and staff appointment holders. Dr Ng Eng Hen will be elaborating on the recommendations.

Sir, security is the very basis of our existence as an independent nation, free to chart our own destiny. Without security, we will not have a firm foundation for the prosperity and social harmony which have made Singapore a good home, the best home for all Singaporeans. Without a defence force capable of safeguarding our sovereignty and our vital interests, we may well be nothing more than a state subservient to some bigger country or - worse - cease to exist as a nation. Singaporeans understand the need for a strong SAF and they are committed - as National Servicemen and the family members who support them - to playing their part in ensuring that the SAF continues to anchor the peace and security we have enjoyed for the last 40 years. Thank you, Sir.

Back to top

Last updated on 19 Apr 2006


Privacy Statement \| Terms of Use	© 2008 Government of Singapore